Relationship between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots during the British rule 1878-1960

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Abstract

As national consciousness was developing within the Cypriot society, the traditional tolerance towards the 'other' was gradually but firmly replaced by fear, threat and eventually enmity. The role of the religious institutions, the interests of local elite intelligentsia, the economic inequality and the nationalist factions from Greece and Turkey, all contributed to the alienation between the communities of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The old bonds and the new shared social structures, such as trade unions, did not succeed in transforming the society on grounds other than religion and divisive nationalist ideologies.

The spirit of cooperation was largely prevented by the British colonial rule established from 1878 until 1960. The intransigence of the colonial policies triggered the prevalence of the radical elements. When the weakened British presence in the region was reaching its ending in the 1950's, the instigation of outside powers for involvement in the island's domestic affairs culminated in the clash of the two competing nationalisms and the ensuing institutionalisation of the division.

Keywords: Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Britain, nationalism.

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Preface

This dissertation was written as part of the MA *in Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean Studies* at the International Hellenic University.

The general objective of this thesis is to outline the internal and external dynamics that affected the relationship between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots during the British rule from 1878 until 1960. A special focus is placed on the first decades of the British administration until the annexation of the island in 1914. The events during the 1950's until the Independence at the end of the decade played a pivotal role in the political and diplomatic history of the island. Yet, the foundations of the problematic construction of the Cypriot identity lay in the past.

As it has often been pointed out by many scholars, the case of Cyprus is not unique. The British rule until 1960 was rather typical of a colonial empire in the Middle East. Following the collapse of the Ottomans and the instigation by the European colonial powers, the Eastern Mediterranean peoples introduced the doctrine of nationalism for the cohesion of the diverse ethnic groups towards the building of a *nation* and the legitimacy of *national* self-government. The peculiarity in the case of Cyprus relates to the fact that the aspiration of the island's majority community for self-determination involved unification with another state and not independence. The evolution of this ideology was vulnerable to marginalization and to high risk of failure. The interventions of outside powers, as well as the perceptions these interventions have generated among the local population fuelled the complexity of the relationship between the two communities.

The *first chapter* describes the impact of the British administration on Cyprus during the first decades. It contains the transitional stage and the first changes on the most important aspects of public life (legislation, language, education and the socio-economic developments).

The *second chapter* elaborates the rise of Greek Cypriot nationalism by placing emphasis on two fundamental components of this evolution. The first one relates to the ethnarchic role of the Church of Cyprus and the importance of retaining this role under the British domination. The second factor is the idea of *enosis*. The ideology of unification with Greece and its impact on the ensuing sociopolitical developments until 1960 are discussed as expression of irredentist ideology and as political leverage in

Cypriot history. The chapter concludes with reference to the effect of Greece's participation in the First World War on Greek Cypriot national aspirations.

In *chapter three* the critical junctions for the rise of Turkish Cypriot nationalism are attempted to be identified. The rise of Turkish Cypriot nationalism against the *enosis* movement remains incomprehensible unless the Turkish nationalism is explored. From the Young Turks movement to the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the presentation of the fundamental principles of this evolution provides a fuller understanding of Greek - Turkish relations and reveals the historical and psychological foundations of the two competing nationalisms in Cyprus. The brief reference to the Great War and the regional environment until the Treaty of Lausanne sheds light to the perspective of the rising geopolitical importance of Cyprus and Turkey's subsequent involvement. Within this context, the reaction to these developments within the Turkish Cypriot community consist the last part of this chapter.

Following the presentation of the ideological pillars of both nationalisms in Cyprus within their historical framework, *chapter four* describes the continuation of the British colonial rule in the island from the beginning of the twentieth century until 1950, with underlying focus on the structural sociopolitical changes that affected the two Cypriot communities, their relationship and the British involvement in that process. The growing inter-communal tensions, the impact of the Great War in Cyprus, the 1931 uprising in the volatile interwar period and the inflexibility of the colonial rule to address the local requests are discussed as a defining stage towards the polarization of the Cypriot society and the outburst of violence. Following World War II, the reshuffling of powers inside and around Cyprus is examined.

Chapter five describes the preparation of the imminent conflict against the background of internal developments but also the regional environment during the Cold War and the British withdrawal from Eastern Mediterranean. The outline of EOKA's fight against the colonial rule, the ensuing inter-communal clashes and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus are presented as the culmination of a lasting process of alienation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and the pursue of different objectives. *Chapter six* contains the main conclusions for the role of the internal and the external factors that defined the relationship between the two communities during the eighty-two years of colonial rule in Cyprus. The appendix

includes maps, a table of demographic data and images of representative scenes, events, ordinary people and protagonists in Cypriot history during the reference period.

The selection of bibliography was a challenge due to its plethora and, occasionally, its partiality. The intention has been the combination of older and more recent literature from various scholars and sources.

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I owe thanks to my supervisor, Associate Professor Iakovos Michailidis for his valuable advice. From the onset, his attitude on tolerance and respect for the various 'others' and their own perspective has been much stimulating. I am indebted also to Professor Spyridon Sfetas for communicating his profound knowledge in simple ways to the benefit of his diverse audience.

I have benefited greatly by the kind assistance of administrators and staff of the International Hellenic University Library, the Library of the Department of History at the Aristotle University and the Eleftheriadis Library of Anatolia College.

To Despina goes my love and gratitude for the relentless offering of options in my life.

Contents

Introduction

Alongside to the great Eastern civilizations, the Cypriots created a distinct Hellenic culture, marked through the ages by the strategic location and the mineral wealth of the island they lived in since the seventh millennium B.C. The position as a crossroads for the commerce of three continents and the lands rich with copper brought the Mycenaeans-Achaeans settlers from Peloponnese to Cyprus. The spread of the Mycenaean culture heralded the Hellenization of the island as a gradual and peaceful process, attested to be completed during the 12th century B.C. Scholar Vasos Karagiorghis points out the paramount importance of this evolution for the history of Cyprus, an island geographically[1] but also in terms of economy, culture and-sometimes- politics turned towards the East.[2] Among numerous conquerors, pirates and settlers, ancient Greeks and Persians, Byzantines and Arabs, Catholics and Orthodox Christians, Christians and Muslims, a cultural diversity was formulated and, through the ages, an element of dualism underlaid the history of Cyprus.

In the sixteenth century, the inaction of the Venetian rulers, the disputes between the Christian Cypriot leaders and the apathy of the native population paved the way from the conquest of the island by the Ottomans. Although the Christian European powers defeated the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto, at the same time in Cyprus, following a siege to Nicosia and Famagusta, the Ottoman rule was established in 1571 for the next three centuries. The Greek Cypriots were rather positive to the transition from the Venetian autocracy to the new domination. There were cases that the Greek element actively supported the new rulers. The religious hatred between the Orthodox and the Latin clergy -once again in history- brought closer the Ottoman East instead of the Christian West.[3] The nucleus of the island's Turkish community emanates from the Ottoman soldiers and the succeeding settlers from Southern Anatolia. The newcomers settled in agricultural lands confiscated from the Latins and lived scattered in most parts of the island.

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[1] Cyprus is located 97 kilometers west of Syria, 64 kilometers south of Turkey and 380 kilometers east of Rhodes island.

[2] Vasos Karagiorghis, 'Cyprus in Antiquity', in Tenekidis G., Kranidiotis G. (eds.) *Κύπρος: Ιστορία, Προβλήματα και Αγώνες του λαού της* [Cyprus: History, Problems and Struggles of her people] (2nd ed., Athens: Estia-Kollaru, 2000), 17-21.

[3] Giorgos Georghis, 'Από την πρώτη στη δεύτερη αγγλοκρατία: 1191-1878' [From the first to the second British rule: 1191-1878], in Tenekidis G., Kranidiotis G. (eds.) *Κύπρος: Ιστορία, Προβλήματα και Αγώνες του λαού της* [Cyprus: History, Problems and Struggles of her people] (2nd ed., Athens: Estia-Kollaru, 2000), 112-117; Eugene K. Keefe and Eric Solsten, 'Historical Setting' in Eric Solsten (ed.) *Cyprus: A Country Study* (fourth edition, USA: Library of Congress, 1993), 17-18.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire, a shadow of its former self, ceded the island to Britain in 1878. When the British arrived, the harbours had declined and the economic activity was weakened because of the empire's commercial ineptitude. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, infestations of locusts, lack of water and famines also contributed to the general condition of decay. As the medieval social structure was fading away, the communities resurfaced in search of a new modus vivendi in a shifting environment.

The British rule until 1960 in Cyprus is often described in literature as a typical example of the "divide and rule" policy which resulted, almost inescapably, into an intergroup conflict. In 1956, J. S. Furnivall described the effect of the British rule in the colony of Burma, the spread of nationalist ideology and the breakdown of traditional social institutions as follows:

> "At the beginning of the century it was a commonplace to describe the Burman as tolerant of foreigners, though indifference was a more accurate description of his attitude. At that time such racial or class feeling as may have existed was limited to Europeans, who found Indians less attractive than Burmans, had little sympathy with Indian Nationalism, and to some extent were already apprehensive of Indian competition. But twenty years later, Burmans were held to feel a 'natural antipathy' to Indians."[4]

In the case of Cyprus, many scholars have challenged the accuracy of this perception as an over- simplified approach of a far more complicated case of nationalism(s) that marked the modern history of the island.

In the late nineteenth century, doctrines of the West were introduced by the British rule into the traditional society of Cyprus. These doctrines were imposed over populations that were formulated into the multiethnic environment of the Ottoman Empire and therefore were alien to their practical experience of political representation. While most subjects of the empire in the Middle East considered themselves either Sunnis or Shiites or Druzes or Maronites or Greek Orthodox or 'Latins' or Jews, official British documents referred to the population in the colony of Cyprus as 'Greek' and 'Turk'. By 1931 and the first violent demonstration on part of the Greek Cypriots

[4] J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice* (New York, 1956), 196.

against colonial authority a drastic shift from a (sole) religious identity to a national one paved the way to a conflict zone. The catalyst was the infestation of nationalist ideologies, as these were perceived by the traditional structures of the Cypriot communities, combined with the demands of peaceful coexistence under the colonial regime of artificial, imitative adoption of European constitutional practices and the British view of 'pluralism'. Political manipulation, uprising and suppression ignited perpetual rivalries. As Elie Kedourie has stressed, "national self-determination is a principle of disorder, not of order."[5]

The pattern of establishing colonial rule by collaboration with a colony's minority was not a British exclusivity. To the east of Cyprus, in Lebanon, when the Maronites felt threaten by the prospect of an independent Arab state, the French regime offered them a safety net within the French 'jewel in its new Middle Eastern empire.'[6] Some years later, the formation of a greater Lebanon from Syria and the following incorporation of large Sunni and Shia Muslim minorities set in motion those powers that resulted in a civil war and the ultimate eclipse of - the loyal to the French - Maronite leadership. In short, David K. Fieldhouse contends that, "it is arguable that the worst thing the French did in Lebanon was not to postpone independence and continually interfere in Lebanese politics, but to create a plural society".[7]

On the former Ottoman island of Cyprus, a Greek-speaking Eastern Orthodox Christian majority of some 80 per cent and a Turkish-speaking Muslim minority of some 20 per cent had lived together under British administration since 1878.[8] Greek and Turkish Cypriots had previously lived mixed,[9] though, by the end of Ottoman rule, in towns there was an apparent concentration into quarters[10] as reflection of social distinctions.

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[5] Elie Kedourie, 'A New International Disorder', in *The Crossman Confessions and Other Essays in Politics, History and Religion* (London 1984), 99.

[6] David K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 328.

[7] Ibid., 329.

[8] Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey A modern history* (third revised edition, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 237.

[9] The 1832 Ottoman census recorded 172 mixed villages, see Niazi Kızılyürek, 'The Turkish Cypriot Upper Class and Question of Identity', in Kızılyürek N., Naldoven F., Yashin N., Yucel H. (eds.) *Turkish Cypriot Identity in Literature* (London, 1990), 21 cited after Andrekos Varnavas, 'Cypriots Transforming their Identity during the Early British Period: From a Class, Religious and Regional Identity to a Hellenic Ethno-Nationalist Identity', in Michalis N. Michael, Tassos Anastassiades and Chantal Verdeil (eds.) *Religious Communities and Modern Statehood: The Ottoman and Post-Ottoman World at the Age of Nationalism and Colonialism* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2015), 151.

[10] Rolandos Katsiaounis, *Labour, society and politics in Cyprus during the second half of the nineteenth century*, Cyprus research centre texts and studies of the history of Cyprus, XXIV (Nicosia, 1996), 49.

The relationship between Eastern Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Cyprus, has often been portrayed as a peaceful one.[11] Especially in the rural areas, maybe due to common difficult living conditions for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, they appear to have formed a shared set of customs – neither Greek nor Turkish exclusively.[12]

It is clear, though, that within a strictly hierarchical society, the majority of the Christians in the island- like elsewhere within the Empire – did not escape the fate of the non-Muslim peoples being slaves to the Sultan, subjugated and living within a despotic and oppressive medieval regime. The Muslim Cypriots did not enjoy uniformly the benefits that derived from their membership in the governing *ümmet* (the religious community that commanded the empire), but when compared to the Christians, for example a Muslim along with a Christian Cypriot before the law or in the case of tax per capita for the non-Muslim subjects only, they were at an advantageous position. Numerous reports from Christians subjected to abuses caused by Turkish Cypriots were found in the archives of the Bishops of the island.[13]

[11] Michael A. Attalides, 'Οι σχέσεις των Ελληνοκυπρίων με τους Τουρκοκύπριους' [The relations of the Greek Cypriots with the Turkish Cypriots] in Tenekidis G., Kranidiotis G. (eds.) *Κύπρος: Ιστορία, Προβλήματα και Αγώνες του λαού της* [Cyprus: History, Problems and Struggles of her people] (2nd ed., Athens: Estia-Kollaru, 2000), 416 – 418.

[12] M. A. Ramady, 'The role of Turkey in Greek-Turkish Cypriot Communal Relations', in Coufoudakis V. (ed.) *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict: In memory of Stephen G. Xydis* (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976), 4-5.

[13] Katsiaounis (1996), 55.

CHAPTER ONE

The British rule: the first decades

In 1878 the Ottomans handed over Britain the control of the island of Cyprus. The British annexation of Cyprus in November 1914 followed the outburst of the First World War and the island was transformed into a fully fledged British crown colony after 1925. The idea behind this offer was the confrontation of the Russian menace and the consolidation of an alliance between the collapsing Empire and the colonial British Crown. Though the former retained the suzerainty over the island until the end of the first World War, there was a clear transfer of power, encompassing notions from the previous socio-economic regime.

From the British standpoint, there were two main motives for the acquisition of Cyprus. The first one was related to strategy. Cyprus was not the first choice for Britain. The island lacked a decent port and malaria further repelled the presence of British soldiers. It offered though – ideally coupled with Alexandretta – an outpost for the British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and a base to safeguard the Euphrates river and the land route to India and its resources should the Suez Canal become inaccessible.[14] Some years later, in 1882, when Egypt was put under the British control, any investment on Cypriot infrastructure was curtailed.[15]

Secondly, Cyprus was envisaged to evolve into a role model of the British-led modernization of the Ottoman territory in Asia Minor. The 'pacific invasion of Englishmen into Turkey' in the context of a wide Anglo-Ottoman reforming alliance could use as a spearhead the case of Cyprus. Such plans, though, were soon to be abandoned and the newly acquired colony was in search of a new role in serving the British interests. Cyprus was not important for the British crown until some decades later when new actors appeared on the regional scene and a new balance of powers emerged.[16]

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[14] Robert Holland and Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes in Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850–1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 164.

[15] Giorgos Tsalakos, 'Σύντομη επισκόπηση ορισμένων όψεων της αγγλοκρατίας στην Κύπρο' [Brief review of certain aspects of the British rule in Cyprus], in Tenekidis G., Kranidiotis G. (eds.) Κύπρος: Ιστορία, Προβλήματα και Αγώνες του λαού της [Cyprus: History, Problems and Struggles of her people] (2nd ed., Athens: Estia-Kollaru, 2000), 143.

[16] Holland and Markides (2006), 165.

General Sir Garnet Wolseley was the first British High Commissioner in Cyprus, answerable to the Colonial Office. He had accepted his appointment rather grudgingly; he did not believe in the project of reforming the Ottomans and from the beginning he established a distance between the new administration and local society.[17] Wolseley tried to superimpose on religiously defined institutions some modernized procedures and principles of administration, the intention being to render them 'into something like British shape'.[18] Very soon, though, he received instructions not to 'dislocate the existing [Ottoman] machinery'.[19] In any case, raising taxes, as the main preoccupation of the all kind of rulers, remained unchangeable during this period of change.

The British political culture, based on the separation between State and Church was in striking contrast with the Ottoman tradition and the *millet* [20] system. The British and the belief in their own superiority and distinctiveness was politically and philosophically against the secular character of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. It was only a matter of time the new regime to meet with great expectations, suspicion and, eventually, resistance from the local ecclesiastical elite. Common interests shaped ways of cohabiting but the profound differences undermined the development of a real, mutual understanding.

The 1882 constitution

On 30 November 1882 a new Constitution was promulgated in Cyprus. Under its provisions, a representative institution, namely the eighteen-member Legislative Council[21] replaced the previous Ottoman *Medjli Idare* (The Central Administrative Council). Its members from local society were elected separately by the two communities (3 Muslims, 9 Christians). The rest six members were British officials appointed by the High Commissioner.[22] The allocation of elected places in the chamber was in accordance with the demographic composition of the island; it was a drastic alteration compared to the previous regime. It is also obvious that the British, when

[17] Ibid., 165 – 166.
[18] F. Maurice and George Arthur, *Life of Wolseley* (London, 1924), 101, cited after Holland and Markides (2006), 166.
[19] Ibid, 93.
[20] *millet* (A. milla), in modern Turkish "nation", in classical Arabic, a community of faith, in 19th century diplomacy, a non-Muslim community in the Ottoman Empire.
[21] This Legislative Council was also called, mockingly, a "toy parliament" since its member were not entitled to make any decision about the budget, see Heinz A. Richter, *A Concise History of Modern Cyprus 1878-2009*, Peleus, Bd. 50 (Mainz: Rutzen, 2010), 22.
[22] Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *The Cyprus Question, 1878–1960: The Constitutional Aspect* (Minneapolis: Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, 2002), 25–28, cited after Holland and Markides (2006), 168.

collaborating with the Turkish Cypriots representatives, could overturn any decision of the Greek elected members within this constitutional framework. In case of a numerical deadlock, the High Commissioner held the decisive vote. These constitutional provisions established the political segregation of Christians and Muslims and the subsequent formation of two, institutionally recognized, political entities in Cyprus.[23]

The introduction of the system of free[24] elections for the Legislative Council was, no doubt, a turning point in the governance of the island. However, it was not accompanied by an equivalent enrolment in public administration. By the end of the nineteenth century, Greek Cypriots, who represented almost 80 per cent of total population, occupied 50 per cent of the government posts under the British higher officials. The discrepancy was even higher in the recruitment of the police force.[25]

At the same time, a very important transformation of the island's legal and judicial system was accomplished, in line with British principles. A Supreme Court was established in Nicosia and the application of Ottoman Law by the District Courts was gradually but decisively fading away. Overnight, one of the most significant pillars of the social status was modernized. The British reforms, especially the ones regarding the legal institutions, targeted mainly those who had benefits from the previous regime, the Muslim officials**:**

> '[I]t cannot be denied, and the fact should not be lost sight of, that the British occupation has very greatly injured one class, viz., that from which the former Government obtained the majority of its public employés,"[…..]"To the Moslem officials," [British rule] "was soon shown to be a gradual, if not a sudden, ruin.'[26]

[23] Sia Anagnostopoulou, 'Η Εκκλησία της Κύπρου και ο Εθναρχικός της ρόλος: 1878-1960' [The Church of Cyprus and its ethnarchic role: 1878-1960), *Σύγχρονα Θέματα* [Current Affairs], 68-70, (2002), 201.

[24] The use of the term 'free' is appropriate only compared to the previous system. In fact, the British had established, by law, certain financial criteria for the participation of the Cypriot voters that resulted in excluding a significant number of them. Furthermore, during the first years of elections, the voting was not secret and therefore many voters could not freely express their political preference.

[25] By the end of the century, the Greek Cypriots occupied 237 out of 472 in total. The Turkish Cypriots, though only 20% of the population had 198 posts (42%). Preference for minority communities was more pronounced in the case of the Armenians and Maronites who, comprising 2% of the population, were allocated 37 posts (8%). As late as 1919, out of 763 men in the police force, 420 (55%) were Turkish Cypriots, see Katsiaounis (1996), 81.

[26] Report by Colonel Warren enclosed in Biddulph to Colonel Stanley, 18th December 1885. CO 883/4, 25, cited after Altay Nevzat 'Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus: the first wave' (doctoral dissertation, University of Oulu, 2005), 106.

The Turkish Cypriots. The first reactions

The Muslim Cypriots protested every one of these reforms. Meanwhile, both the elite and the mass of Muslim community collaborated with the British rulers against Christian community who outnumbered them by four to one,[27] formally within the Legislative Council in most cases, but also outside of it.

The first Turkish newspaper, *Saded*, was published eleven years after the Greek Cypriots edited their first newspaper in August 1878. This delay is an indication of a community with a different political attitude, lacking political culture. Indeed, the Turkish Cypriots found themselves unprepared, bereft of their traditional institutions following the collapse of the medieval social structure. The transition was a challenge for both communities. But furthermore, religion and state, in Islam, stood the one inside the other.[28] Secular view of society was a concept in contradiction with the fundamental principle of order in the medieval Empire under the Ottomans. The lack of a Muslim middle class[29] further contributed to the backwardness of their intellectual and political activity[30] compared to Greek Cypriots – at least until some decades later and the introduction of nationalist ideologies within the Turkish Cypriot community under the influence of the marching Young Turks in Asia Minor.

In 1933 Zeka Bey describes in the *Söz* newspaper the reaction of the Turkish Cypriots in the post-Ottoman period in the following words:

> "After Turkey has departed from this island, the remaining Turks are like orphans who have been deprived of motherly love. For quite some time they have found themselves in a state of bewilderment as to what they should do and were even very late in coming to the realization that they were orphans. The Turks, accustomed to living on the island as members of the dominant community, were not easily capable of comprehending their changed circumstances on the island and the need to change their attitude. On the other hand, the other group, which they had for centuries learnt to live with as a community under Turkish administration, was in a superior position to us. When faced

[27] Katsiaounis (1996), 66.
[28] Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (2nd ed., London: Hurst & Company, 1998), 8.
[29] Katsiaounis (1996), 67.
[30] Charles Beckingham has described the Turks during the first 30 years of British rule as *intellectually inactive and politically apathetic*, see ibid., 67.

> by such an organized, competitive group that was in the majority, and lacking a government on whose unconditional support we could rely, as the days passed we began to lose our position."[31]

The absence of the old safeguard, the "Ottoman hand" for the support of the Turkish Cypriots coupled with the economic advancement of the Greek Cypriots and the latter's expressed desire for unification with Greece, formulated an uneasy environment for the relationship of the two communities under the British government. The boundaries between the elites and the peasants - irrespective of their religion – remained very strict. The social boundaries between Christians and Muslims were permittable. There was a clear segregation of the two communities, yet it was not highly politized until some decades later. There was, though, a growing tension and suspicion that underlaid their common living. Rolandos Katsiaounis mentions a deputation of Turkish Cypriots, led by the Mufti Ali Refki Effendi who had filed a formal complaint "that the Christians had adopted a menacing attitude and that ill-feeling had spread to women and boys [and according to the deputation], the disturbance was being caused by Greeks in the market place and in public houses and brothels which stayed open during the night."[32]

Language and education

Most of the Turkish Cypriots were bilingual; along with the Turkish Cypriot they also spoke the Greek Cypriot dialect.[33] In 1881, 5,4 per cent of Turkish Cypriots had stated Greek as their mother tongue.[34] The same did not apply in the Greek Cypriot community, where only a small percentage of its members would use the dialect of their Muslim neighbours. The elites of both communities and the emerging middle class used English as the lingua franca.[35]

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[31] Fedai, H. (ed.) *Bas¸hekim Zeka Bey* (Nicosia, 2002) 112, cited after Niyazi Kızılyürek, 'Rauf Denktaş: Fear and Nationalism in the Turkish Cypriot Community', in Aktar A., Kızılyürek N., Özkırımlı U. (eds.) *The Troubled Triangle Cyprus, Greece and Turkey* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 176.

[32] Katsiaounis (1996), 210, based on the official document SA1:266/1895, "Confidential", Interview of Ali Refki, Mufti of Cyprus, and others with Sir Walter Sendall, High Commissioner, and the members of the Executive Council, April 22, 1895.

[33] D. Karoulla-Vrikkis, 'Language and ethnicity in Cyprus under the British rule: A linkage of heightened Salince' *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 168, (2004), 22.

[34] Niyazi Kızılyürek, and S. G. Kızılyürek, 'The politics of identity in the Turkish Cypriot community and the language question', *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 168, (2004), 46.

[35] M. Karyolemou, 'When language policies change without changing: The University of Cyprus', *Language Policy 1*, (2002), 217.

The 'Rushdie' schools had opened in Cyprus shortly before the official British arrival, providing post elementary education from 1862 onwards. By the 1890's twenty-one such schools had been established throughout the island, its curriculum based largely on the modern secondary education guidelines. Most of schools, though, particularly elementary ones, remained nominally under the communal control and the religious institutions. The Greek Cypriots, as Michael Attalides stresses, attended their own schools in a more autonomous way compared to the Turkish ones.[36] The Greek Cypriots funded their own schools[37] for the modernization of the education. The structure of the Ottoman traditional schools, placing emphasis in their curricula on law and theology was a factor that caused the higher degree of control by the British– only until the events of 1931 and the sanctions imposed on all sectors of administration following the uprising of the Greek Cypriots.

The foundations of separated educational institutions laid back to the Ottoman period when Christian and Muslim students attended different schools. As a result, social mobilization could not develop among ethnic groups. All schools followed a largely religious curriculum directed by the *priest* and the *hoca* respectively. Panayiotis Persianis argues that the British were not willing to invest in education reforms in Cyprus.[38] The new rulers of the island respected the right of the communities to select the schools of their choice. This 'adapted education' policy was practised at other colonies as well and was promoted as a manifestation of liberal principles. But in fact, the policy of establishing and running multiracial schools controlled by the central authority demands significant financial resources the colonial regime - through its 'liberal' approach, conveniently - avoided to provide.

The 'Megali Idea' and the infiltration into Cyprus

A school of 'modern learning', modeled on the Philological Gymnasium of Smyrna, was reported to be in operation in Cyprus already in 1819.[39] Through a

[36] Michael A. Attalides, 'The Turkish Cypriots: Their Relations to Greek Cypriots in Perspective', *Cyprus Reviewed* Michael A. Attalides (ed.), The Jus Association (Nicosia, 1977), 78.

[37] After 1878 schools came under the control of the Greek Brotherhood of the Cypriots of Egypt following the refusal of the member of the community in Cyprus to pay the canonical dues, see Panayiotis Persianis, *Church and State in Cyprus Education: The Contribution of the Greek Orthodox Church to Cyprus' Education During the British Administration 1878-1969*, s.n. (Nicosia, 1978), 158, cited after Varnavas (2015), 159.

[38] Panayiotis Persianis, 'The British Colonial Education "Lending" Policy in Cyprus, 1878-1960: An Intriguing Example of an Elusive "Adapted Education" Policy', Comparative Education, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1996).

[39] Reported in the journal 'Logios Ermis', see Paschalis M. Kitromilides, *Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2013), 313. For the formulation of the *Great Idea* see also: Paschalis M. Kitromilides, 'On the intellectual content of Greek nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the

network of educational institutions, the Greek irredentist ideology, on the grounds of unity and continuity of Hellenism inside and outside the Greek state, nurtured the aspirations of all Hellenes living under difficult conditions. The 'Great Idea' dominated Greek domestic politics and foreign policy until 1922. As Paschalis Kitromilides has pointed out, the conception of this idea "for the unredeemed Greeks of the Ottoman Empire was a concrete aspiration for political order and material progress under the aegis of a national entity with which they could identify symbolically and culturally."[40]

A channel of communication between Greece and Cyprus was institutionalised through the presence of the Greek embassy in Nicosia from 1846 onwards. The young Greek Cypriot elites, following their studies at the university in Greece would become socially prestigious upon their return to the island. Additionally, through commercial networks with other centres of Hellenic Diaspora like Smyrna, Constantinople and Alexandria, the dominant ideology of the National centre penetrated Cyprus. The adoption of nationalist ideas, on the other hand, was aided by the implementation of reforms by the Ottomans in 1830, 1839 and 1856. [41]

At the beginning, the Greek Cypriots had viewed the British rule as a mere transitional stage on the way to unification with motherland Greece, encouraged to this aspiration by the recent history of the Ionian Islands.[42] Soon they realized that on the most vital issues, as representatives of the majority of the total population of the island, they were politically powerless, in other words not very far from how they had lived under the Ottomans.[43]

On March 8, 1895 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir W. Harcourt, delivered a speech indicating that, if Britain was to evacuate Cyprus, it would revert back to Turkey.[44] Shortly afterwards, the Greek Cypriots strongly opposed to this statement and held rallies all over the island. The Commissioner of Nicosia, Merton King reported:

Great Idea', in David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (eds.) *Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity* (London, King's College: Ashgate 1998).

[40] Kitromilides (2013), 332.

[41] Tsalakos (2000), 152.

[42] Katsiaounis (1996), 66.

[43] Holland and Markides (2006), 168.

[44] Parliamentary Debates, Vol. XXX I (Fourth Series), March 8, 1895, columns 686-698, cited after Katsiaounis (1996), 209.

> "The numbers that attended the meeting did not, I think, exceed two thousands of which fully one half were residents of the town of Nicosia, and of these again, a very large proportion were lads of 18-20 years of age, or even younger, and it was chiefly by these last named members of the audience that the cheers were raised, and applause given to the telling points in the speakers' addresses, as also the most vociferous shouts condemning the taxes and the Tribute. The numbers that assembled at Government House were greater, I think, by three or four hundred, than those at the meeting...At this assembly too, no spectator could, I think, fail to be struck by the tender age of a very large number of those of which it was composed."[45]

Individualism and the notion of citizenship were alien to the Ottoman subjects. Political power had been completely detached from all social strata.[46] Apart from the elites of each community and their representative political role, most of the people in Cyprus were living, for centuries, confined to their households and dealing with family affairs.[47] But the air of modernization in the administration of the island by the British had brought hopes in the minds and the hearts of Greek Cypriots, who had been hoping for *enosis* with Greece from the onset of the new regime. Even though the reality did not meet these expectations, the shift from a despotic regime to a more liberal one, established by the British rulers, gave a new impetus and a new direction to the young Cypriots and their potential for participating in the conduct of public affairs.

It may not be far from truth to say that education in the Christian schools was a vehicle for the propagation of nationalist agendas. During the nineteenth century and before the British rule, only few Cypriots were literate. Access to education was not a privilege for everyone, and was related almost exclusively to religious context. During the last decades of the century and for varying time periods, many young Christian school boys in Cyprus had received the basics of Hellenic education. Katsiaounis further elaborated the issue of young Greek Cypriots from lower social classes by stressing the importance of "their first contact with social reality during their conscious life and their experience of the misery and deprivation which characterized the late

[45] CO 67/91, M. King, Commissioner of Nicosia, to A Young, Chief Secretary, April 29, 1895. Enclosed in Sir W. Haynes-Smith, High Commissioner, to the Marquis of Ripon, Secretary of State for the Colonies, May 6, 1895, cited after ibid., 209.
[46] Berkes (1998), 16
[47] Katsiaounis (1996), 220.

1880s and the years after."[48] Panayiotis Persianis who studied the educational system in Cyprus from 1878 until 1960 contends that already from the decades following 1821, Greek teachers in the schools of Cyprus were teaching under the direct influence of the 'Megali Idea'.[49]

By the end of the nineteenth century the historical narrative of Greek Cypriots marked a significant change in its perspective. Tefkros, as founder of the Cypriot city of Salamis, emerged as the mythical ancestor of Cypriot people, in line with the new theoretical edifice of 'Greekness' and the appeal to the glorious ancient past of Hellenes. Only one century before, Archimandrites Kyprianos had published his *Chronological History* of the island of Cyprus according to which the people of the island traced origins from the biblical world and Hettim, the grandson of Noah. As Paschalis Kitromilides argues, this shift on the eve of the twentieth century was only part of a regional transformation of identities in Eastern Mediterranean and the emergence of national consciousness in the former Ottoman lands.[50] This historical manipulation, under the supervision of the Church of Cyprus, set the background for the proliferation of nationalist ideologies, through public education and the discipline of History that facilitated "the reproduction of myths and their acceptance as historical facts."[51]

There are not many British sources about the education of the Turkish Cypriots during the last decades of the nineteenth century; there is no evidence that they nurtured the ideas of Turkish nationalism among the Muslims in the island through educational institutions. There were, though, public expressions by members of the community over the need for reforms in the curricula of their schools 'as patriotic duty'. The request included a less religious context, more oriented towards modern sciences - along with

[48] Ibid., 209-210.

[49] Panayiotis Persianis, 'Church and State in the development of the education in Cyprus 1878-1960', in Brian Holmes (ed.) *Education and the Mission Schools* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), 244.

[50] Rebecca Bryant, 'The Censoring of Lower Class Political Culture and the Invisibility of Class Conflict', in Bryant R. and Papadakis Y. (eds.) *Cyprus and the politics of memory, History, Community and Conflict* (London - New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 72.

[51] Michalis N. Michael, 'History, Myth and Nationalism: The Retrospective Force of National Roles within a Myth-Constructed Past', in Aktar A., Kızılyürek N., Özkırımlı U. (eds.) *The Troubled Triangle Cyprus, Greece and Turkey* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 158. Michael uses as an example of continuous reproduction of stereotypes and myths the case of Archbishop Kyprianos who is portrayed by national historiography as a supporter of the Greek struggle for independence, documenting this position with the contacts that Kyprianos had with members of Filiki Heteria.

reading and writing - and harmonized with the process of modernization already applied at the time – to some degree - in the Christian schools.[52]

Economy

The reforms of the British administration had drastically curtailed widespread corruption, paving the way to the improvement of the economy.[53] In the context of a largely peasantry economy, trading activities were intensified,[54] the circulation of newspapers was increasing and prosperity seemed to be more feasible for Cypriots - but not for all of them. The distribution of this growth was not equal between the two communities. Even though they shared a common past during the Ottoman period and there was interaction between Christians and Muslims, the cultural differences played a decisive role in their economic evolution.[55] The Greek Cypriots were clearly performing better in economic terms. The traditional Ottoman structure was an impediment to the evolution of bourgeois among Muslims and to the accumulation of wealth within the more liberal economic environment the British promoted in Cyprus. The reaction of the Turkish Cypriots was rather confined to the preservation of as many privileges as possible under the new British leadership.[56]

The emerging middle class, centred mainly in Limassol and Larnaca, gradually formed a new political power in opposition to the traditional hegemony of the Cypriot Orthodox Church and the conservative establishment around the Archbishopric in Nicosia.[57] During the 1890s nationalist ideas were spreading but this evolution was not in contradiction with keeping close relations between elite circles and British officials, since the latter were the most important customers for the former. The middle class in Cyprus included, among others, many lawyers with ambitions for a career in politics, educated in Athens and affected by the Hellenic nationalist movement; the High Commissioner reported in 1900:

> "The village communities are composed of a fine peasantry who are at present contented and industrious. The town communities, however,

[52] *Kibris* (Turkish Cypriot journal), 13th March 1893 and 4th December 1893, cited after Nevzat (2005), 131, 107.
[53] Katsiaounis (1996), 65-66.
[54] Between the two years ending 31st December 1878 and 31st December 1879 the total value of trade (imports plus exports), increased from £334,979 (177,651 + 157,328) to £530,625 (308,407 + 222,218), an increase of 58.4%, see ibid., 78.
[55] Holland and Markides (2006), 168.
[56] Katsiaounis (1996), 78.
[57] Ibid., 66.

> contain many political agitators, including several Greek advocates, who have little business and who have much to gain from agitation."[58]

The cultivation of nationalist sentiment, apparently, offered an opportunity for social and economic advancement, a new pole of mass consensus outside of religion, especially to those who were previously excluded from power. The senior clergy and the tax collectors were now interested in securing the privileges they were granted by the Ottomans and, thus, were more careful with the new rulers. The lower classes, though, did not have much to put in risk and, for that reason, along with the 'patriotic duty', there was a desire to legitimize their own political and economic status.[59] The shift of rule from the Ottomans to the British had triggered the struggle for power between the two leading communities in Cyprus. It was of great importance the fact that antagonism between members of the same community was also sparked. This competition played a decisively role in shaping the aspirations and in adopting – at different times - nationalist rhetoric by both communities.

The 'Tribute' and the first agitations

The annual tribute was a focal issue among both communities – even though for different reasons. This tribute was payable under the Cyprus Convention to the Sultan and thereafter was fixed at £92,000. This sum was a great burden for the weak and mostly agrarian population of the island along with the taxes imposed by the British administration. In 1889 taxation per head of population in Cyprus was 16s., compared to 14s.3d. in Samos, and 8s. in Crete. The Turkish Cypriots, though, viewed this payment as a connection with the Porte and their wishful thoughts of returning to the Ottoman Empire. Exactly for this connotation, the Greek Cypriots resented even more the outflow of funds in the name of the Ottoman rule that no longer existed in practice. On top of this, both communities soon realised that this tribute was not received by the Ottoman treasury but by the British and French bondholders as compensation for the non - serviced 1855 Crimean War Loan by the Sultan.

Indicative of a growing anti – government sentiment and its use by different groups was the case of the deputation to the Colonial Office in London and the

[58] CO 67/124, "Confidential", W. Haynes-Smith, High Commissioner, to J. Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, August 4, 1900, cited after ibid., 179.
[59] Ibid., 181-182.

accompanying memorandum addressed to the queen of England.[60] Following the economic crisis of 1887, a widespread discontent erupted initially among the peasants which was expressed in the traditional form of petitions to the government. Very soon, though, the misery of the peasantry met the poverty of the labourers and the nationalist ideas promoted by the (ambitious) bourgeois living in the major cities. The taxes were not collected and the state revenue was sharp falling. The agitation was accelerated, imbedded with clear political underpinnings. Delegates from all over the island decided to proceed to the deputation. At the beginning, the Turkish Cypriots supported the movement but later they decided to abstain because they disagreed on the demand for the abolition of the annual tribute, which even though a burden, it still signified the link to the Ottomans. Another rupture occurred over the leadership and the rivalry between the two poles of political expression within the Greek Cypriot community. In the words of the High Commissioner, the deputation was the decision of the majority "though not without a strong opposition by the more moderately inclined persons".[61] In other words, probably for the first time, the ecclesiastic elite was dragged into a decision, aiming to confirm its leading role. The delegation of 1889 requesting that the level of taxation be lowered, the tribute be cut by half and assistance be granted to the agricultural sector of the economy was fruitless, but it revealed in public life the new social divisions in Cyprus.

In any case, the distance between elites, on one hand, and the rest of the people, on the other, remained clear. Class and religion were still the main determinants of identity. The relationship of those competing elites over power, their degree of collaboration with the British rulers, the inner-communal rivalries and, most importantly, the adoption and use of current nationalist ideologies coupled with the economic inequality significantly curtailed the possibilities of creating a common Cypriot identity.

[60] Ibid., 183 – 189.
[61] CO 67/52, Bulwer to Knutsford, May 18, 1889, cited after ibid., 186.

CHAPTER TWO

The rise of Greek Cypriot nationalism

In 1896, seventy-five young Greek Cypriots were recruited for the patriotic cause of the Cretans against the Ottoman rule. They embarked in Crete following the local revolt, while the Cypriot Archbishop, as head of a committee, expressed solidarity by offering humanitarian aid to refugees.[62] But the crises in the Near East from the mid-1880s onwards[63] and the growing tension in the Balkans between the Greeks and the Ottoman Turks which resulted in the Greek-Turkish War in 1897 set limitations for pursuing national causes in Cyprus. The outcome of this unfortunate - for the Greeks - war, supported by 1,000 Greek Cypriot volunteers[64] rendered the Christians in Cyprus more skeptical about their action plans. They considered they had to wait for more adequate circumstances for the realization of their objective while they continued to foster the ideal of *enosis* mainly through the education of the next generation. In the aftermath of the war, both Christian and Muslim elites continued to collaborate with the British and the gap between the two communities was growing deeper. Publicly, political activity diverged into other matters of wide interest.[65]

The Church of Cyprus

The principles of the British administration posed a serious challenge for the religious institutions of both communities. The roles assigned by the previous regime was in need to be reaffirmed in a social reality that was undergoing structural changes. The Orthodox Church in Cyprus had experienced different degrees of collaboration with the Sultan during the three centuries of the Ottoman rule. In general, the segregation of the non-Muslim groups had cultivated the elements of cohesion amongst the members of each group and had facilitated the protection from influences that might upset the established order. These groups were recognized by the ruler who granted them, by his favour, administrative and juridical rights and duties.[66] Within this context, the

[62] Ibid., 210.
[63] Holland and Markides (2006), 170.
[64] For a study of the phenomenon of Cypriot volunteers in enosis struggles, see Petros Papapolyviou, *Φαινόν Σημείον Ατυχούς Πολέμου: Η Συμμετοχή της Κύπρου στον Ελληνοτουρκικό Πόλεμο του 1897* [A Bright Point in an Unfortunate War: The Participation of Cyprus in the 1897 War] (Nicosia, 2002), cited after ibid., 170.
[65] Ibid., 170.
[66] Berkes (1998), 11-12.

Archbishop of Cyprus, as head of the Christian Orthodox Church in the island,[67] was recognized as a kind of delegate of the Sultan within his community. The reforms applied during the Tanzimat period in the nineteenth century vested this role with an institutional form as part of the *millet* system. The Eastern Orthodox Christian Church was part of hierarchical system based on deference and obedience. Absolute loyalty to the supreme ruler was a prerequisite for the community to keep its traditions and its cultural distinctiveness. The ecclesiastical leader was not appointed by the ruler; the legitimacy for the approval of his role by the Sultan derived from the fact that he was the person who expressed the will of the community.[68] Against this background, the context of the term 'ethnarch' should be viewed and analysed. The diffusion of the 'Megali Idea' and the ideology of irredentism rendered the 'millet' into 'Genos' but since there was a national-political center now established in Greece, the 'millet basi' - the Archbishops just like the Ecumenical Patriarch - was in threat of his authority being curtailed. Eventually, the Archbishop of the Cypriot Orthodox Church was identified as the leader of 'Genos' in Cyprus.

Rolandos Katsiaounis contends that "Christian belief and practice provided the framework within which people were expected to live".[69] The power of the Orthodox Church was far beyond the political representation of the enslaved Greek Cypriots under the Ottomans and their national desires under the British. The Church was the trustee of the Byzantine traditions, of the legacy of the empire that had lasted over one thousand years and was the link that connected modern Greeks with their ancestors in antiquity. Byzantium could not be viewed disconnected from Christianity. The Christian Cypriots, for many centuries, could not perceive their cultural and spiritual identity outside of the influence of the Church. By the mid nineteenth century, education and intellectual activity in the island – with only few exceptions in Larnaca and Limassol- were largely intermingled with religious context; only two bookshops existed in the capital and both were selling books of religious content, by rule imported from Smyrna.[70]

[67] The Cypriot Orthodox Church was autonomous from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. Therefore, its head was the secular and spiritual leader of the community in Cyprus.

[68] Sia Anagnostopoulou, 'The Complexities of Greek Nationalism in its Cypriot Version', in Aktar A., Kızılyürek N., Özkırımlı U. (eds.) *The Troubled Triangle Cyprus, Greece and Turkey* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 198. Furthermore, the Cypriot Church had retained the tradition of the Early Christian period, according to which Christian laymen participated in the procedures for selection of the Prelates.

[69] Katsiaounis (1996), 56.

[70] Ibid., 56.

The British rule can be described as a disaster for the hegemony of the Cypriot Orthodox Church within the Greek Cypriot community, in terms of finances and political leverage. The British administrators, upon their arrival, may have perceived the Christian *millet* as a (distant) part of Europe, mainly due to the religious relatedness, partly due to a common reference to the Hellenic-Roman culture.[71] But, in any case, the privileges of the Cypriot Church belonged to the past. The British administrators kept a very firm stance on this matter. The -profitable– duty for tax collection, the exemption from property taxes for ecclesiastical lands, the immunity of the clergy for cases of common law were all abolished by the British.[72] The Church's income shrunken by more than two thirds,[73] whilst old title deeds of the Church and of several Prelates over enormous territories to pasture and forest land were disregarded and eventually lost to them by the new administration.[74]

In December 1878 Captain A. G. Wauchope, Commissioner of Paphos, reported on the imposition of *vergi* (property) tax upon the district's monasteries:

> "The Bishop here tries to make out that by some fermans of ancient date they are exempt. But of fermans I am ignorant and at present am trying to collect from the convents as per margin."[75]

The establishment of the Legislative Council in 1882 had signified the institutional abolition of the political role of the Church.[76] New political powers appeared, eager to assume the – continuously undermined by the British- leadership of the Greek Cypriot community, traditionally identified with the ecclesiastical elite. But the emerging social group lacked the experience and the ideological framework to confront directly the hegemony of the Church and the "by God given" authority. The split of the Greek Cypriot elite into two factions was inevitably transferred within the religious establishment. The first group, led by Archbishop Sophronios, opted co-operation which the British and good relations with the Muslim elites - in other words, a favourable re-arrangement of the Ottoman hierarchical social system in a modernized context. The members of this group included the conservative or traditional rich elite,

[71] Varnavas (2015), 157.
[72] Katsiaounis (1996), 73.
[73] The figure is mentioned in a letter of Archbishop Sophronios dated 6th/18th December 1894, in John Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus* (London, 1901), 264, cited after ibid., 3.
[74] Ibid., 74.
[75] SAl:1878/Box 3, A. G. Wauchope, Civil Commissioner of Paphos, to George Greaves, Chief Secretary, December 1, 1878, cited ibid., 73.
[76] Anagnostopoulou (2002), 200.

the Prelates, merchants, land owners, farm-tax collectors, money-lenders. The other fraction, under the Bishop of Kitium, adopted an active nationalist agenda advocating *enosis* with motherland supported by members of the middle class in Limassol and Larnaca, freemasons, manufacturers, merchants and lawyers -many of the latter educated in Athens. It should be stressed that none of the members of both factions had raised an aggressive anti-colonial rhetoric; most of them were doing business with the British and promoted the networking with the rulers for their private interests.

In the 1901 elections for the new Legislative Council, the nationalists (the *Kitiakoi*) won all nine seats allocated to Greek Cypriots. The British officials understood at the time that the slogan for *enosis* with Greece had assumed a dynamic force:

> "And although it is true that the Greek Cypriots would prefer British rule to that of any other power, they now leave no opportunity of raising the cry for Union. But the mode of expression is very different to what it was a few years ago."[77]

The old establishment, though, was not willing to cede power. This growing competition became more apparent during the elections for the new Archbishop, following the death of Sophronios in 1900.[78] Political tension was accelerated by the attraction of the impoverished segments of Christian Cypriot peasants and workers. They were vulnerable to clientelism and intimidation exerted upon them by both factions within a ferocious conflict that deeply divided the Cypriot society.[79] The involvement of the lower social strata –still under the tight control of the elites - and of many young Greek Cypriots – who had never encountered the Ottoman rule- paved the way to imminent demands for more active participation in the political scene and the patriotic cause.

The nationalist Archbishop of Kitiun, elected by the majority of the Greek Cypriot voters, was eventually enthroned only after a decade. The division over an ecclesiastical question revealed an important development in the socio-political reality

[77] CO 67/128, R. L. Michell, Commissioner of Limassol, to A. Young, Chief Secretary, November 8, 1901, cited after Katsiaounis (1996), 239.
[78] The 'Archiepiscopal Question' was part of the conflict between the Greek state and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. However, the peculiarities in Cyprus, attracted much attention by various political and diplomatic actors in the region.
[79] Katsiaounis (1996), 231 – 234.

in Cyprus. It relates to the evolution of the *enosis* ideology which resulted in the prevalence of a nationally minded Church. The dogma of *enosis* and the *ethnarchic* aspect of the Cypriot Church will develop, thereafter, in reciprocal relationship. This change marked the pause of the curtailment of the Church's power in the internal political scene. The infiltration of nationalism in the Christian Orthodox establishment provided an aspect of 'sacred' to the ideological content of the struggle for *enosis.* Simultaneously, the Church assumed a 'national' character which reflected the popular sentiment of Greek Cypriots but was *not* deeply connected with the longstanding tradition of the Christian Orthodox Church of Cyprus.

The quest for 'Enosis'

'Crete is not a pleasant neighbour for Cyprus,' Haynes-Smith complained to Chamberlain in London.[80] The Cretan revolution had a dual impact on internal politics in Cyprus. Firstly, it offered a model for Greek Cypriots; autonomy under a Greek prince in Crete was an appealing arrangement for those dreaming of unification with Greece. Among the Turkish Cypriots and their own dream of reuniting with the Ottoman Empire, the opposite sentiment was spreading. Secondly, the British felt the threat coming from the notion – supported now by the example of the Cretans - that a change of the regime could be the outcome of a violent uprising against alien rulers. Such discussions were already beginning to be advocated in Cyprus within the most radical circles.[81]

The idea of *enosis* with motherland Greece was a catalyst in the development of the relationship between the two communities in Cyprus. Under the influence of the "Megali Idea", the Greek Cypriot nationalists by the end of the nineteenth century had already established a narrative of continuity of Hellenism, implanted and spread through education whilst *enosis* had become the main discourse. From the onset of the British rule and the disintegration of the medieval hierarchy, the emerging middle class advocated a nationalist ideology expressed by *enosis* that also signified a desire for modernization.[82] In this context and within the wider geopolitical framework, nationalists - despite their criticism of British colonialism - viewed Britain as a great

[80] Haynes-Smith to Chamberlain, 30 Aug. 1902, CO883/6, cited after Holland and Markides (2006), 171.
[81] Ibid., 171.
[82] Andreas Panayiotou, Hegemony, Permissible Public Discourse and Lower Class Political Culture, in Bryant R. and Papadakis Y. (eds.) *Cyprus and the politics of memory, History, Community and Conflict* (I.B. Tauris, 2012), 83. For the relevant discussion on *enosis,* see 82-90.

power that eventually would offer Cyprus to Greece, so as the latter would become a client state in the region under the hegemonic British sphere of influence.

There was also a strategic dimension to *enosis* and its rhetoric. The distinction between uncompromising nationalists (*adiallakti*) and 'compromisers', traditionalists (*diallaktiki*) was shifted during the following decades. The idea of autonomy or independence appeared as an alternative option, instead of *enosis*, in line with the evolution of political struggles and the rhetorical tactics of all political groups. For example, when the communists appeared in the political scene of Cyprus during the 1920s, they advocated independence. This attitude was in accordance with the theoretical edifice of communism encompassing all lower classes - irrespective of religious or ethnic barriers and opposed to the ideology of *enosis* expressed by the Orthodox Church and the bourgeois politicians. In the 1940s, the same political group, under the influence of the political events in Greece, made a drastic shift in their objective by demanding '*enosis* here and now'.[83] In the 1950s, the adoption of the '*enosis* and only *enosis'* slogan was used by the Right's politicians against the communists as a measure of "Greekness" – in reality, as another aspect of the rivalry between them.

For the majority of the inhabitants in the island the Greek Cypriot identity gradually meant the – more or less fervent – support of the *enosis* ideology within a secularized context, patronized by the Archbishopric. The expectation for unification with Greece in the view of the Greek victories in the Balkan Wars further diminished the chances of any sincere dialogue with the Turkish Cypriots. The latter found themselves confined in two options. The first one was the acceptance of minority status – in case of unification with Greece - within a state comprised by Christian ex-Ottoman subjects. The second option was the modernisation through their own self-determination, attached to the powerful British rulers for protection and approaching the Young Turks for the nationalist narration.

The entrance of Greece in World War I and the impact on Cyprus

Following the Balkan Wars, Greece had succeeded in territorial expansion to the north. Macedonia and the vulnerable Balkan frontiers remained the focus of integration and military preparations in the years to come. Under the leadership of Eleuftherios

[83] Ibid., 85.

Venizelos, Cyprus was never elevated to a high territorial priority issue. The division within the Greek society between the adherents of Venizelos, on one part, and of King Constantine, on the other, known as *dixasmos* had a profound effect in Greek politics. Its impact had reached the Greek Cypriots as well– paradoxically the British administrators allegedly favored the Germanophile king against Venizelos whose political inclination towards Britain has always been clear.[84] But the most memorable diplomatic event regarding the Cypriot history during this period was the offer of the island, in 1915, to Greece as an inducement for the entry into the World War I on the side of the Allies. The urgency of the proposal was dictated by the strategic need to secure the Balkan front and the provision of military aid to Serbia against the Bulgarian threat.

The Greek king and his Prime Minister, Alexander Zaimis, opted for neutrality and refused the offer.[85] Thus, what appears to be the greatest opportunity, so far, for Cyprus and the peaceful settlement of regime was lost. "Perplexed and passive" was how Lord Clauson described response of the Greek Cypriots when the news arrived in the island through the Athenian newspapers.[86] The Christians in Cyprus accepted the low ranking of their demand for *enosis* in the Greek agenda and they hoped for a favourable resolution - even directly - between Athens and London after the end of the war. When these expectations remained unfulfilled during the succeeding peace-making talks, Venizelos told the Greek Cypriots that 'they should not appear [...] intransigent to the advice of the National Centre.'[87] Greece was in no position to put in risk the gains of the previous ten years war and depended upon Britain in terms of security and economy. A confrontation with London over Cyprus was not a feasible political option for Venizelos. But the offer had created the idea of legitimacy for ceding Cyprus over Greece should the British decide to leave the island. In other words, the declined offer was viewed by the Greek Cypriots as an acknowledgement on part of Britain that, on national grounds, the Greek Cypriots were not unjustifiable to claim for unification with

[84] For the alleged British favor to the 'Constantinists' within the island see material in CO67/188, cited after Holland and Markides (2006), 179.
[85] For this episode see M. Woodhouse, 'The Offer of Cyprus, October 1915', in Constantinos Svolopoulos (ed.) *Greece and Great Britain during World War I* (Thessaloniki, 1985), 82–86, cited after ibid., 177.
[86] Clauson to Colonial Secretary, 11 Nov. 1915, CO67/177, cited after ibid., 179.
[87] G. S. Georghallides, *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus, 1918–1926* (Nicosia, 1979), 124, cited after ibid., 180.

Greece.[88] Yet, this perception was more of a consolation to the Greek Cypriots and less of a political reality.

[88] Charles William James Orr, *Cyprus under British rule* [first published in 1918] (London: Zeno Publishers, 1972), 163-164.

CHAPTER THREE

The rise of Turkish Cypriot nationalism

The Turkish Cypriot nationalist ideology had remained almost dormant during the first decades of the British rule. On the eve of the new century, rupture amongst Turkish Cypriots, suggestively, had erupted between the factions of the chief cadi (religious judge) and the Mufti (the chief interpreter of religious law, responsible for issuing religious decrees or *fatwas*).[89] But nationalist ideas and the subsequent distinction between 'modernists' and 'traditionalists' within the Muslim community were only activated when the 'motherland' country abolished the sultanate, soon afterwards the caliphate and eventually a republican form of government was established, based upon the sovereignty of the people constituting one nation, the Turkish nation.

From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism

During the Hamidian era - unlike the Arabs and the Albanians in the Ottoman empire - the Turks, especially the common people, identified themselves only as Muslims.[90] The sense of nationality and the differentiation of the Turks from the other Ottoman Muslims was at first expressed in the literary and educational fields.[91] The origins of Turkish (or Turkist) nationalism emerged initially as a cultural movement in the nineteenth century and it was related to the work of European Orientalists and their interest in studying the origins of the Turks in Central Asia. Equally influential were the bourgeois Turks from the Russian Empire, notably the Tatars and the Azeris (also known as 'Tatars' at the time).[92]

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman empire was forced to cede more than 60 percent of its territory.[93] Until the Balkan Wars in 1913 the collapsing imperial regime had signed agreements over population exchanges with Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. Violent acts, slaughters and expulsions were not excluded by any

[89] Holland and Markides (2006), 173. *Fatwas* means authoritative opinion given by a mufti.
[90] Berkes (1998), 318-319.
[91] Ibid., 320-321. The first time the word 'Turk', which had a derogatory connotation in Ottoman times, was used in a positive way, as an honourable collective designation, was in 1897 by the young poet Mehmet Emin, who proudly declared himself a 'Turk', see Spyros A. Sofos and Umut Özkırımlı, 'Nationalism in Greece and Turkey: Modernity, Enlightenment, Westernization', in Aktar A., Kızılyürek N., Özkırımlı U. (eds) *The Troubled Triangle Cyprus, Greece and Turkey* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 89.
[92] Zürcher (2004), 129.
[93] Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' crime against humanity. The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012), xiv.

side. The aim to homogenize the newly established states within territories that have been for centuries the homeland of various populations became a constant source of tension and inter-ethnic rivalries. After the Balkan Wars, more than 80 percent of the European lands (and nearly 70 percent of its European population) were lost to the Ottoman Empire.[94] A prominent Tatar political thinker of (Pan)Turkism, Yusuf Akçura[95] declared,

> "We have been defeated. The Bulgar, the Serb, the Greek - our subjects of five centuries, whom we have despised, have defeated us. This reality, which we could not conjure up even in our imaginations, will open our eyes, will serve as a terrific slap in our faces to turn our heads in sane directions - if we are not yet entirely dead."[96]

Following the disastrous defeat, a huge wave of Balkan Muslim refugees headed toward southeast Anatolia, the home of a large Christian population.[97] The ruling party, the Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter CUP)[98] marked this historical event not with a "religious outcry, but as a spur to national regeneration".[99] All modern societies at the time were ruled and motivated by national ideals, while the religious ideals were weakening. If the remaining Ottoman territory was to avoid further partition by the Western powers, the leaders of the CUP envisaged a transformation of their state by adopting– selectively – notions of the Western civilization.[100]

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[94] For the demography of the Ottoman Empire, see: Justin McCarthy, *Muslim and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 110. See also by the same author, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995), 181–203, all cited after Berkes (1998), 31, 166, 254-256.

[95] Yusuf Akçura (1876-1933). A Tatar born in Russia. He came to Turkey as a boy with his mother when his father died. Akçura studied at the War Academy in Constantinople . Before he graduated as a staff officer he was banished in 1897 by Abdul-Hamid's court to Fezzan. He escaped to France and studied political science and history under such men as Albert Sorel and Émile Boutmy, see ibid., 321; Zürcher (2004), 129.

[96] Kâzim Nami [Duru], "Yeni Hayata Doğru," *Türk Yurdu,* III, No. 2 (1912), 62, cited after Berkes (1998), 358.

[97] Akçam (2012), xiv.

[98] The first organized opposition group seems to have been established in the Military Medical College in 1889, when four students founded the İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti (Ottoman Unity Society), which aimed to reinstate the constitution and parliament. The four included an Albanian, a Kurd and a Circassian. This society slowly grew and some of its members were arrested by the sultan's police. Others managed to flee abroad, mostly to Paris, but also to Cairo and Athens. In Paris, they found a small circle of Ottoman constitutionalist émigrés, who called itself Jeunes Turcs (Young Turks), much as the Young Ottomans had done thirty years earlier. The leading figure in this circle was Ahmet Rıza. He was approached by the plotters in Constantinople and became the leader of the organization in Europe in 1895. The Young Turk movement, together with the disputations of the new Westernists, had boiled down to two aspirations. These had been introduced first by Namtk Kemal and were expressed by the two words: union and progress. Union meant the co-operation of all nationalities within the Ottoman unity. Progress implied the bringing about of a social revolution through educational and economic measures, Zürcher (2004), 86-87; Berkes (1998), 325.

[99] Ibid., 358.

[100] Akçam (2012), xv.

The cultivation of Turkish culture became the substratum of this new vision. The Unionists[101] was an elitist class, detached from the people. They did not rely on the support of any solid religious, ethnic or social group within their country. The emergence of the CUP was not the outcome of a massive uprising. Another aggravating factor for the realization of the new vision was the reality of modernity within the Ottoman empire during its last period. The modernization in economic and social terms, was accomplished by the non – Muslim populations. But Christians were not included as components or even partners in the planning of the new state:

> "Just as the Jews and Germans constituted the bourgeoisie in Poland, in Turkey it was the native Jews, Greeks, and Armenians who were the agents and middlemen of European capitalism, and the Levantines whose nationality and citizenship are known to no one. If the Turks fail to produce among themselves a bourgeois class by profiting from European capitalism, the chances of survival of a Turkish society composed only of peasants and officials will be very slim."[102]

The word *millet* means "nation" in Turkish. But, traditionally, nation was perceived by the Ottomans as a community based on a religious affiliation, in no way related to any notions of nationality - language was not a safe marker of identity. Following the disintegration of the Ottoman *millet* system and between the absence of a solid national identity and of a (Muslim) middle class for the economic revival of the new country, Islam and its role in the new reality posed the most fundamental issue. The Islamists could not provide a convincing proposal for the regeneration of the country.[103] Since in Islam state and religion could not be conceived as individual concepts, the question of secularization of religion was raised by the Unionists. Gradually, what was planned to be modernized – for example law and education - ceased to be religious, while "religious increasingly comprised anything that was not changing or should not change."[104] Against the so-called Islamic ideologies, "the Turks would be merely citizens in their relationship with the state" and Islam would survive as part of the national culture.[105] Religion, however, never ceased to be fused in the life of most Turks. State and society remained and evolved in the following decades as individual

[101] The members of the Committee of Union and Progress.
[102] Akçura, *Türk Yurdu,* No. 140, 2521-2522, cited after Berkes (1998), 426.
[103] Ibid., 424.
[104] Ibid., 414.
[105] Ibid., 502, 365.

(not always separated) entities. Islamists did not disappear from the political scene either; during the 1950's the conservative ruling Democrat Party resurfaced Islamic notions in public life when the need to attract new voters appeared.

The 'awakening' of the Balkan nations and the creation of the Balkan states were triggering factors for the Turkish nationalism. But it was the emergence of national movements among the non-Muslims in territories that could not be ceded from the Empire that enflamed nationalist sentiments among a larger number of Turks.[106] The Turkish national culture was formulated to include Muslims and Turks. The ethnoreligious homogenisation of Anatolia, a *demographic policy* as defined by Taner Akçam, was set in motion.[107] Furthermore, the appearance of the Arab and, to a lesser extent, Albanian, and Kurdish political movements demanding autonomy or political separation[108] became the decisive factor for the secularization of the Turkish nationalist movement. The Unionist leaders planned the reduction of the Christian population by expulsion or massacre as a prerequisite for the control of the remaining territories. Non-Turkish Muslims, such as Kurds, Arabs, and Balkan migrants (including refugees from Christian persecution) were relocated and dispersed amongst the Turkish majority to be assimilated into the dominant culture.[109] The ideal of Muslim Turks as the sole inhabitants of Anatolia was projected as a matter of national security.

The reform program of CUP for the secularization of the state was planned to be accomplished via Turkification. The Western civilisation would provide the cultural elements "only as models for the cultivation of a modern national culture".[110] Besides the civil aspect of nationalism, the Unionists also developed the idea of economic nationalism:[111]

> "The Turkish national awakening in Turkey is the beginning of the genesis of the Turkish bourgeoisie. And, if the natural growth of the Turkish bourgeoisie continues without damage or interruption, we can say that the sound establishment of the Turkish state has been guaranteed."[112]

[106] Ibid., 318.
[107] Akçam (2012), xv.
[108] Berkes (1998), 319.
[109] Akçam (2012), xiv, xv, xvi.
[110] Berkes (1998), 366.
[111] Ibid., 425.
[112] Akçura, *Türk Yurdu* (the Turkish Homeland), No. 63, 2102-3, cited after ibid., 425.

Some decades later, following a systematic campaign of threats and intimidation against Christian entrepreneurs, the events on September 1955 against the Greek Christian Orthodox minority and their properties were manifestations of this type of nationalism.

By the end of the Great War, the Unionists suffered a devastating defeat. The Ottoman Empire had lost all its Arab land, the Entente powers where present in the capital assuming control over the Straights, while Greeks and Italians were planning further partitions on the Western shores of Asia Minor. The Bolshevik leaders had an ambivalent attitude towards the Turkish nationalist movement.[113] The Anatolian peasants, physically exhausted and further impoverished by the war, were not willing to be involved in any more adventures in the name of nationalist or revolutionary ideology. Stirring the ashes, Mustafa Kemal capitalised on these sentiments. He acted as the catalyst for the transformation of the Turkish nationalism through a Turkish – Islamic synthesis and paved the way towards the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

The aim of Kemalist nationalism was the identification of the Turkish nation with the Turkish homeland, that is Anatolia, and the significant reshuffling of its entire population. Kemal realized that the only realistic option for the consolidation of his power and for the foundation of an independent and secular modern state was the renunciation of any ideology of irredentism and Pan-Turkism.[114] The cultural unification of the Turks, extending from the Mediterranean Sea to Central Asia, would be promoted. The political unification – utopian at the time - would remain only as a very distant ideal.[115]

The regional environment during the Great War and the Treaty of Lausanne

The Ottoman Empire entered the Great War in August 1914 on the German side. Supported by the military might of his ally, the sultan had proclaimed a jihad against Britain, French and Russia.[116] On the hand, the European powers managed to instigate the Arab Revolt in the Ottoman-ruled Arab lands. The Turkish forces had failed to take control over the Suez Canal and few years later, under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk,

[113] Ibid., 433-435.
[114] Michael A. Attalides in *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics* (Mohnesee: Bibliopolis, 2003), 37.
[115] The only exemption to this policy until World War II was the case of Alexandretta, which can be explained in correlation with the case of Cyprus.
[116] Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. and Aomar Boum, *A concise history of the Middle East* (eleventh edition, USA: Westview Press, 2016], 188.

they were retrieved in Syria and finally in Iraq. In October 1918, an armistice was signed in Mudros but the map of Middle East was predetermined in the secret agreement of Sykes-Picot in 1916 between Britain, France and Russia.[117] As for Cyprus, it was agreed that Great Britain would not give up Cyprus without prior consultation with France; the control in the region around Alexandretta is thereafter connected with Cyprus. The new equilibrium of power in the Middle East had upgraded the significance of Cyprus[118] as a base for monitoring the territorial gains of the First World War, the new mandates – 'disguised colonies'[119] - set up by the victorious Allies. For France and Britain, as universal empires, the idea of nationalism and self- determination in Europe suited their ambition. They could run their distant colonies all over the world, without security distractions, while the emerging nation-states in Europe would act as a buffer zone against Germany and Russia.[120] To the south-east Europe, the Ottomans had been defeated. The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 ended the state of war between Germany and the Allied Powers. Under its provisions, sixty million people were given their own state but, simultaneously, other twenty-five million were turned into minorities.[121]

Only few years later, in 1922, the Greek army front in Asia Minor was defeated by the Turkish military forces and the balance of powers was overturned. The territorial settlement between Greece and Turkey came to a final resolution with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, an arrangement including human and diplomatic-political implications.[122] A significant number of Greek and Turkish populations were rooted off their lands - solely based on the criterion of religion. In Turkey, even though Ismet Inönü on his way back from Lausanne was not welcomed by the Turkish Prime Minister,[123] he had effectively negotiated on equal terms with the winners of the First World War, whereas the Greek delegation was confined to opt for "the lesser evil".[124] The large influx of refugees signified a great challenge along with a sense of grief for what was lost forever. For both countries, a process of nation-building and structural adjustments was set in motion. In Turkey, the establishment of the Turkish Republic

[117] Ibid., 188-191.
[118] Holland and Markides (2006), 178-179.
[119] Goldschmidt and Boum (2016), 198.
[120] Mazower (1999), 42.
[121] Ibid., 41.
[122] Spyridon Sfetas, 'The Legacy of the Treaty of Lausanne in the Light of Greek- Turkish Relations in the Twentieth Century: Greek Perceptions of the Treaty of Lausanne', *Balcanica* XLVI (2015), 195-199.
[123] Klaus Kreiser, *Atatürk. Eine Biographie* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2011), 182, cited after Sfetas (2015), 196.
[124] Ibid.

and the pursue of integration through secularization of the state marked an unforeseen shift in the country's history.

The Kemalist surge in Cyprus

The Turkish Cypriots had replaced the 'Ottoman hand' with the 'British hand'. Their economic backwardness coupled with the advancement of the *enosis* ideology within the Christian community urged them to clung more closely to the new rulers. The Great War marked the finale of the Ottoman Empire and posed a serious complication to the relationship with the British.[125] On 2 November 1914, the High Commissioner informed the chief cadi, the Mufti, and other leading Muslims that they were now officially British subjects:

> "[T]hey expressed', he reported, 'the view that Great Britain was now fully justified in taking any action against Turkey as was thought fit, and ... added that Cyprus should be annexed by England and her inhabitants ... released from the intrigues of Constantinople."[126]

Petros Papapolyviou argues that almost 1,000 Turkish Cypriots joined the British army fighting against the Ottomans from 1916 until 1919.[127] The provisions of the Treaty of Sevres in 1919 included the renunciation by the Ottoman Empire of all rights and title over or relating to Cyprus. By this time the term "Turkey" is used for the first time implying a national Turkish state in Anatolia.[128] In 1920, in an article published in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Doğru Yol* the sentiment of injustice is described:

> "We know not why the destruction of an innocent & just nation should be desired in order to please the Armenians & Greeks whose crimes

[125] Britain unilaterally renounced the Cyprus Convention and annexed the island at the beginning of the First World War. Turkey acknowledged the annexation in 1923 in the Lausanne peace treaty. Yet, the raising of the tribute continued, under a new name – first as "the share of Cyprus of the Turkish Debt Charge", later as public debt of the colony, see Richter (2010), 19.

[126] Goold-Adams telegram to Harcourt, 2 Nov. 1914, CO67/174, cited after Holland and Markides (2006), 176-177.

[127] Petros Papapolyviou, 'Η Κύπρος και ο Πρώτος Παγκόσμιος Πόλεμος' [Cyprus and the First World War], lecture at the London Free University on 10 Dec 2015, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uFwA_TSpJsk (last accessed in 24.07.2017).

[128] It was used in a speech of Kemal Ataturk delivered on 1 December 1921. In Ottoman writings up to the middle of the nineteenth century, and in many of them much later, the word 'Turkey' is not used. It was a Western term, used by Westerners to describe a country which the Turks themselves usually called 'the lands of Islam', 'the Imperial realm', 'the divinely guarded realm', or, when more local definition was required, 'the land of Rum'. In the mid nineteenth century, the Young Ottomans, at first, made use of the word "Turkistan", a Persian formation meaning Turk-land. Later, probably because this term was already pre-empted for Central Asia, they abandoned it in favour of "Türkiye", an adaptation of the European name which in 1923 became the official designation of the country, see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1968), 332, 333, 352, 353, 354.

> are quite in the open. It is a great injustice to expect a nation to be entombed by its deadly enemy without the nation raising its voice. In such case the world which is already in a confused state will become more confused & confounded. The earth will again be dyed with the blood flowing from the veins of mankind.
>
> We wonder whether such a scene of carnage cannot be averted with a tingle of justice. One must be confident that after such a war peace cannot precede justice. Will the Majesty & grandeur of those who neglect this point be able to tolerate the weight of their responsibility?
>
> Poor mankind! Poor & oppressed Turks! Was this to be your fate while in expectation of peace and rest?"[129]

There is no sufficient evidence to support the active involvement of Turkish Cypriots in the war against the Allies. It has been argued that they provided charitable assistance to the Turks fighting in Anatolia[130] but the political significance of this activity remains ambiguous.[131] Despite the disillusionment of the Turkish Cypriots, a group of young educated people still hoped for the restoration of the nominally Ottoman, now Turkish rule. They admired the leader who defied the settlement of Sevres, Mustafa Kemal.

The emerging differentiation within the Muslim community had similar characteristics with the one that had already appeared some decades ago among Christian Cypriots. During the 1920s, the collaborationist elite of the Turkish Cypriots was challenged by the co-religionist young elite intelligentsia in Nicosia.[132] Besides the apparent commonalities in the infiltration of nationalist ideologies in both cases, there were three important differences compared to the Greek Cypriots: the overall underdevelopment, the lack of experience in political representation and the absence of a 'motherland' willing to support ideologically (and financially) the national awareness. The Muslims in Cyprus, though the upper classes were attached to the British rulers, when compared to the Greek Cypriots they were still lagging well behind in terms of

[129] Extract from *Doğru Yol* 26nd March 1920, in SA1/1153/1919, 73-74, cited after Nevzat (2005), 261.
[130] Ibid., 259 – 266.
[131] For example, M. Attalides contends that in the mid-1919 Muslim Cypriots appealed for help to the Agha Khan "protesting against the agitation in Greece and the island", see Michael Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics* (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979), 43-44. For the relevant discussion, see Nevzat (2005), 259-260.
[132] Kızılyürek (2010), 177.

modernization. The growing popularity of the demand for *enosis* with Greece further deteriorated the competition between the two communities.

The Treaty of Lausanne had confirmed that Cyprus was not part of the Greek – Turkish relationship. Under the provisions of the Treaty, Muslim Cypriots were made to choose whether to remain in the island and accept British subject status, or to go to Turkey. The colonial government in Cyprus did not encourage them to leave the island; only about 5,000 departed for Turkey.[133] Yet, the establishment of the Turkish Republic was a critical junction for the rise of nationalist ideas in the island. The active involvement of Turkey in the internal affairs of Cyprus would take place only some decades later, but the impact of the rhetoric for a secular state, the idea of a modernized and homogenous nation and the image of power expressed by Kemal Ataturk all together fuelled the hopes of many young Muslims in Cyprus.[134]

Although Ataturk's reforms in the 1920's and the 1930's gave an impetus to change, the Turkish Cypriot intellectuals in Cyprus did not yet consist a generation culturally distinguishable. Furthermore, the membership of the Cypriot Muslims in the new Turkish world was not given. They had to struggle to draw attention to their aspirations, to prove their devotion to the revolutionary movement in Turkey. There was an indisputable religious, cultural and linguistic relatedness to the Turkic populations[135] living in Asia Minor, but the Kemalists in Ankara did not view them as an integral part of the Turkish nation state – at least not before the second half of the twentieth century. Turkish efforts were focused on Anatolia, where the Turks predominated. Mustafa Kemal needed a period of peace with the Greeks and the other outside enemies for the implementation of wide reforms and for the recovery of the country's economy after many years of war. The Muslims in Cyprus were not abandoned, but they were considered to live in a tolerant status under the British rule.

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[133] Holland and Markides (2006), 185. Costas Yennaris rises the number of the Turkish Cypriots (around 7,000 in total) accepting the Kemalist's state invitation to settle in Turkey. He argues that many of them returned to Cyprus because of the poor living conditions they found in Asia Minor while their expectations to take the properties of the expelled Greek populations were not met, see Costas Yennaris, *From the East: Conflict and Partition in Cyprus* (London: Elliott and Thompson, 2003), 31.

[134] At the same period, in Western Thrace a similar division emerged within the Muslim community. Apart from the ideological and the religious dispute between "conservatives" (muhafazakâr) and modernizers or reformers (inkilapçi), the adherents of Turkism in Western Trace aimed to the transformation of the Muslim minority into a Turkish one, see Alexis Alexandris, 'Το Ιστορικό Πλαίσιο των Ελληνοτουρκικών σχέσεων' [The Historical framework of Greek-Turkish Relations], in Alexandris A., Veremis Th., Kazakos P., Coufoudakis V., Rozakis Ch. L., Tsitsopoulos G. (eds.) *Οι Ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις 1923 - 1987* [The Greek- Turkish Relations: 1923-1987] (Athens: Gnosis, 1991), 66-67.

[135] The term 'Turkic' refers to various ethnic groups emanated from Central Asia, living in the former Ottoman lands and includes what is, in modern times, identified as 'Turkish'.

If the 'traditionalist' Greek Cypriot elite had espoused – rather unwillingly at the beginning - the rhetoric of the nationalist faction, the anglophile Turkish Cypriot elites remained loyal to the British administrators. Some reactions by the Muslim elites found in the British archives are not identified as acts of nationalism; they were suspicious of Turkey and unwilling to jeopardize the loss of the institutional privileges they enjoyed under the British administration.[136] As for the mass of the Turkish Cypriots, irredentism was not the driving force for the infiltration of the Turkish nationalism; it was poverty and fear that paved the way. M. Zeka Bey in the Söz newspaper described the condition in 1933:

> "If we were to say that the current economic and financial situation of the Turkish community on the island is dire and, if urgent effective measures are not taken, it will not be long before everything that we currently possess is lost in its entirety, do not call us an 'alarmist' who is unnecessarily exaggerating a danger or excessively pessimistic. The situation of the Cypriot Turks as a community is pitiful and lamentable".[137]

The hope for *enosis* with Greece had drifted the Greek Cypriots apart from the formulation of a common Cypriot identity shared by both the Christian and the Muslim inhabitants of the island. The espousal of a nationalist campaign by the 'Kemalist' Turkish Cypriot faction and the 'imagined separated community of Turks'[138] were decisive steps towards the division. The presence of the British - conveniently - precipitated this rupture by supporting the distinct collective identities based on religious, ethnic and national affiliations.

[136] Yennaris (2003), 20.
[137] Fedai (2002), 111, cited after Kızılyürek (2010), 176.
[138] The phrase used in ibid., 182.

CHAPTER FOUR

The British colonial policy in Cyprus during the first half of the twentieth century

The transformation of the Christian and the Muslim identity into Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism, respectively, was a gradual process initiated largely by external actors and local elite groups; in any case, it was apparently fostered by the British rule. The administrative pattern established by Britain formalized ethnic divisions in the island and encouraged communal politicization. The coalition of British appointed and Turkish Cypriots representatives at the Legislative Council continued to neutralize the Greek Cypriot majority and, subsequently, deepened the rupture between the two communities.[139]

The policy of intransigence

On the eve of the new century, the agitation for the Cyprus tribute was exacerbated by the rise of the annual tax revenue. In 1904 the Treasury in London admitted that Cyprus was paying the highest relative taxes in the world.[140] Following a visit in Cyprus in 1907, as the non-permanent secretary of the Colonial Office, Winston Churchill wrote a memorandum commenting on the situation of the island which was treated in London as "an insane minute":

> "There is scarcely any spectacle more detestable than the oppression of a small community by a great Power for the purpose of pecuniary profit; and that is, in fact, the spectacle which our financial treatment of Cyprus at this moment indisputably presents. It is in my opinion quite unworthy of Great Britain, and altogether out of accordance with the whole principles of our colonial policy in every part of the world to extract tribute by force from any of the possessions or territories administered under the Crown." [141]

After the Archiepiscopal Question was resolved, the Greek Cypriot nationalists would – inevitably - turn against the British administration. On 17 April 1912, all Greek

[139] Van Coufoudakis, 'The Dynamics of Political Partition and Division' in Coufoudakis V. (ed) *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict: In memory of Stephen G. Xydis* (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976), 33-34.
[140] Richter (2010), 18. Richter adds that before the First World War, Cyprus was the only colony paying 27 percent of its annual revenue to Britain.
[141] Cited after Ricter (2010), 18.

Cypriot elected members resigned from the Legislative Council. Large demonstrations, along with the presence of Greek flags and the outbreak of Turkish-Italian war deepened the crisis in the inter-communal relations.[142] Clashes later the same year broke out in a village outside Nicosia and in Limassol. [143] The leaders of the Turkish Cypriots felt the pressure and reacted by moving closer to the ruling authorities.[144] The large number of Greek Cypriot volunteers in the Balkan Wars[145] and the imminent possibility of a war where the British and the Ottomans would be on opposite sides, intensified the preoccupation of the Muslims in Cyprus. This anxiety was not unfounded. Though the British were not willing to make any concession to Greek Cypriot demands, in London they noted that:

> "the sole use of Cyprus is its possible value as an asset wherewith to negotiate [with the Greeks] for more important requirements elsewhere."[146]

Indeed, following the Balkan Wars, Lloyd George and Churchill proposed to the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos the ceding of Cyprus in return for British access to a port on Cephalonia. This proposal soon was withdrawn, but the idea of such an offer was reason enough for both communities in the island to rise the hopes and fears, respectively, towards unification with Greece.[147]

The most important principle for the colonial government was the preservation of order – always in accordance with the British interests. Following the annexation of the island in 1914, C. W. J. Orr in his work, published in 1918, remarks on the efficiency of the British administration:

> "Small wonder that the tendency in a Government office is to treat all questions by a reference to 'previous papers' and veto anything which seems to entail departure from precedent. Nor it is surprising that the

[142] Holland and Markides (2006), 174-175.
[143] The events resulted in five fatalities and seventeen seriously hurt, ibid., 175.
[144] Petros Papapolyviou contents that none Turkish Cypriot joined the Turkish army even though they had the legal obligation to do so. He adds that Turkish army reserves tried to locate them through the British embassy in Constantinople and the Turkish ministry of Foreign affairs, see Lowther to Grey, 25 Nov. 1912, FO 371/1507/33672/52357, cited after Petros Papapolyviou, 'Η Κύπρος και οι Βαλκανικοί Πόλεμοι: Συμβολή στην Ιστορία του Κυπριακού Εθελοντισμού' [Cyprus and the Balkan Wars: Contribution to the History of Cypriot Volunteering] (doctoral dissertation, Aristotle University, 1996), 279.
[145] An estimation involves 1,500 to 1,800 Greek Cypriots volunteers, ibid., 209.
[146] Chiefs of Staffs Paper on the Mediterranean, 28 Oct. 1912, ADM 116/3098, cited after Holland and Markides (2006), 176.
[147] Ibid.

> type of Colonial administrator most in favour in Dawning Street is one who may be trusted to propose no startling new departure, make no important innovations and nurse the expenditure of the colony with unimpeachable economy…. But now that the island has become part of the British Empire it is time to consider whether the Cypriot should not be given a more direct share in the administration…… Jealousy will no doubt continue to exist between the different elements of the population, but this must always be the case in mixed communities and is familiar enough in India and elsewhere."[148]

The repeating, and several times, offensive disregard of the Greek Cypriot quest for *enosis* was clearly reflected on the conviction of High Commissioner Goold-Adams that the vast majority of Cypriots 'do not wish for annexation to Greece, and are content with British rule if outside rule has to exist'.[149] This denial was not the only stereotype used by the British officials. When annexation in 1914 could have paved the way for a more liberal approach to the expressed will of the majority community in Cyprus, the protection of the Turkish Cypriots was then projected as the main reason for rejecting any relevant discussion. The British officials continued to rule under the divisive view that "the hostility of the Moslem Turk towards Greek dominion is infinitely more deep-seated than any feeling of the Greek Christians towards British rule"[150] and that the considerable number of the Muslim community "constitutes a serious factor in the consideration of any scheme for handing Cyprus over to the Hellenic Government."[151]

Following the Treaty of Lausanne, the dramatic ending of the millenia-long Hellenic presence in Anatolia -with only limited exceptions- put the gravestone on the "*Megali Idea"*. Despite the contribution of the Greek Cypriots in the Balkan wars and the Great War,[152] their demands were not included in the peace-making treaties. Yet, the *enosis* movement was not fading at all.

From the onset of the British colonial government, the implementation of several administrative methods had a positive effect to the modernisation of public life. The

[148] Orr (1972), 176, 183.
[149] Goold-Adams to Sir Lewis Harcourt, 22 Feb. 1912, CO67/165, cited after Holland and Markides (2006), 174.
[150] Orr (1972), 169.
[151] Ibid.
[152] According to P. Papapolyviou, 10,000 to 12,000 Cypriot volunteers fought in Greece, almost exclusively on the Macedonian front and the 'Macedonian Mule Corps', see Petros Papapolyviou, Cypriot newspaper *Ο Φιλελεύθερος*, 5 July 2014.

disregard, though, of local requests and realities by the British rule, as Paschalis Kitromilides[153] points out, diminished any prospect for the creation of a liberal political environment. He stresses the importance of the British intransigence towards the political and national aspirations of the Greek Cypriots as a significant factor for the radicalisation and the undermining of the moderate elements. The cultivation of the "Dialectic of Intolerance" alienated the two communities in Cyprus. Gradually, both Christians and Muslims, separately, formulated exclusive political trajectories that constituted the ideological and psychological foundations of the inter-communal conflict.

Socio-economic developments during the Interwar period

In economic terms, the two communities, until the 1950's, can be described as completely united and mutually dependent.[154] The impact of the Great War on the Cypriot economy was severe. The reduced frequency of the sea transportations and the shrinkage of the foreign markets had marked a striking reduction on revenues. The overestimation of primary goods and the increase of the underemployment of the Cypriot labour force worsened the status of the already impoverished lower social classes. On the other hand, the Cypriot mules were a contribution to the war in Middle East and gave a boost to the economy of the island. Additionally, the wages of the Cypriot volunteers in the war, had managed to stop the growing migration flow to the United States.[155] But these positive effects were not enough to reverse the after-war hard reality for the Cypriot peasants.

Against this background, the economic crisis in 1923 found the Cypriots and especially the vulnerable farmers in a helpless situation. Already indebted to moneylenders, many peasants were forced to sell their small properties and move to the towns to look for work. A population of labourers appeared (semi-farmers, semi-labourers); the epicentre was the asbestos mines and the lime industry.[156] The drop in the wages resulted in a life described as "hell". After a short period of little

[153] Paschalis Kitromilides, 'Το ιδεολογικό πλαίσιο της πολιτικής ζωής της Κύπρου: κριτική θεώρηση' [The ideological framework of the political life of Cyprus: critical review], in Tenekides. G., Kranidiotis G. (eds.) *Κύπρος: Ιστορία, Προβλήματα και Αγώνες του λαού της* [Cyprus: History, Problems and Struggles of her people] (Athens: Estia-Kollaru, 2000), 450-454.

[154] Ramady (1976), 5-6. Ramady argues that the economic separation started only under the pressure of underground organizations such as 'Volkan' and TMT, during 1954 to 1959. This process was relaxed with the Independence but after the events in 1963 the economic separation was more vigorously enforced by the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Ankara's tacit support.

[155] Papapolyviou (2014).

[156] Tsalakos (2000), 154.

improvement, the Great Depression and a drought led tens of thousands of peasants to bankruptcy and a new influx of day labourers to towns, struggling to survive.[157]

The demands for improvement of the living conditions of the peasants were set from the onset next to the demand for *enosis*. As Giorgos Tsalakos contends,[158] these social demands formulated the political life in Cyprus as they evolved during the British rule. Even further, these requests by the Cypriot farmers stood at the epicenter of the political calculations of the colonial government but also of the Greek Cypriot circles leading the *enosis* movement. The faction of the "nationalists" infused the *enosis* ideology with a straight connection between the colonial rule and the miserable living conditions of the rural populations. Within an oppressive context, the demand for unification with motherland Greece was identified with freedom and social justice. Therefore, the (inevitable) anti – colonial struggle emerges as the only path towards both national integration and prosperity.

From the 1920's, though, there was some reaction from the labour and the rural movement towards the disconnection between social and national demands. In 1926 the Communist Party of Cyprus was founded, based on the principles of the *Comintern* and in accordance with the doctrine of participation in the so-called (and unrealized) League of Socialist Republics- and against the *enosis*.[159] In 1925, the first issue of *Neos Anthropos*, the publication of Cyprus's Communist Party, promoted the idea of cooperation between the two communities against the colonial rule and in favour of communal justice.[160] In the same year, during the second rural conference, the Rural Greek-Turkish party was founded by members of both communities who warmly supported the continuation of their collaboration on the Legislative Council. When five years later, the newly elected Turkish Cypriot Misirlade Necati Noley voted down the imposition of new taxes, the British governor suspended the work of the Council indefinitely.[161]

The number of the Greek Cypriot deputies had been increased under the provision of the new constitution promulgated in 1925. Their actions were still neutralized by the combined British and Turkish Cypriot votes. The Greek Cypriots thought of this

[157] Richter (2010), 24 – 25.
[158] Tsalakos (2000), 155 - 159.
[159] Ibid., 156.
[160] Yennaris (2003), 34.
[161] Ibid., 35.

constitution as a mockery and the British governor Ronald Storrs had described the whole process as "an exasperating and humiliating nuisance".[162] In the early 1930, a new political organization was created by the Greek Cypriots for the promotion of *enosis*. The more radical elements secretly founded the National Radical Organization of Cyprus (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis Kyprou – EREK), a precursor of the later organization EOKA in the 1950's. This activity provoked a counter movement within the Turkish Cypriot community.[163]

The events on October 1931

In Greece, the stance of Venizelos regarding the island was a very clear one. Upon his return to the political scene, the Greek Prime Minister in 1929 had advised the Cypriots to pause their efforts for *enosis* and endeavour to reforms.[164] Venizelos was decided to build a defensive alliance with Kemal based on mutual interests in securing the Balkan frontiers. The threat by the revisionist Bulgaria and the integration of the refugees were among the high priorities for the Greek Prime Minister. Turkey was also hit hard by the Great Depression: although substantially self-sufficient in foodstuffs, a backward and undeveloped industry coupled with a dangerously unfavourable balance of trade had put her in a very vulnerable economic situation.[165] Both leaderships could largely benefit from a period of friendship. Not without reaction within Greece, at that time it was politically decided that the topic of Cyprus would not risk the Greek-Turkish rapprochement.[166]

The political attitude of the 'National center' was a disappointment for the Greek Cypriots. Yet, this resentment led the latter to the realization that they had to secure their own Hellenic goals depending mainly on themselves, not on Athens. When in 1929 the Labour party won the elections in Great Britain, the Cypriots decided to send another delegation to London, asking for more autonomy and for the refunding of the surplus of the 'tribute.' The Colonial Office insisted on ignoring their requests.[167]

[162] Ronald Storrs, *Orientations* (London: Nicholson & Watson, 1949), 472, cited after Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 26.
[163] Richter (2010), 30.
[164] Ibid., 29.
[165] Lewis (1968), 281.
[166] Alexandris (1991), 69-78.
[167] Richter (2010), 29.

In 1930, both the Turkish and the Greek consul[168] in Cyprus were promoting their nationalist agendas respectively, fanning the flames of political passions. The public dispute between the Greek Cypriot factions – the radicals and the moderates –through the press further exacerbated the tensions. Against this background, a set of actions on part of the British administration triggered a social outcry. Storrs, a philhellene British governor, had succeeded in abolishing the island's tribute already in 1927, but had kept secret from the Cypriots that its accumulated surplus was appropriated by the King. Later when this came out, there was strong reaction from all Cypriots. The elected Greek Cypriot members refused to agree to additional taxation to balance the deficit. The Bishop of Kition resigned from the Legislative Council and along with the nationalists he organized protest meetings.[169]

On 21 October 1931, a crowd of 5,000 excited Cypriots rallied in Nicosia, marching to Government House. They assembled on the forecourt of the residence where negotiations began between the leaders and Governor Storrs. When the night had fallen, 100-150 teenage hooligans[170] threw stones towards the House; the leaders did not manage to stop them. They set fire to the cars parked in front of the residence. Shortly afterwards, the wooden House was ablaze –not before the Governor had managed to escape through the backdoor.[171] Rioting broke out in other towns and villages, with Famagusta the epicentre of unrest. With the help of British troops and warships, order was completely restored in Cyprus by early November. There were seven Greek Cypriot fatalities.[172] The Constitution was suspended and a strict censorship was introduced. Until 1960, Cyprus was governed by decree.[173]

The notable cooperation between the legislative deputies from both communities on urgent socioeconomic problems had been viewed as 'a disturbing weakness'[174] by the British. Following the insurrection, among others, the Bishops of Kition and Kyrenia and two communists were deported; some of the them later formed the hard

[168] The Greek consul was Alexis Kyrou. He was of Cypriot origin, a protégé of the foreign minister Andreas Michalakopoulos. His activity in Cyprus was linked to EREK, defying the policy of Venizelos on the matter of *enosis*. He was eventually recalled, as was his Turkish peer previously, ibid., 30.
[169] Crawshaw (1978), 27.
[170] According to the description in *The Times* newspaper they were egged on by several priests, see *The Times*, 23 Oct. 1931, cited after Holland and Markides (2006), 186.
[171] Richter (2010), 31.
[172] Holland and Markides (2006), 186.
[173] Richter (2010), 32.
[174] Storrs to Passfield, 4 Jan. 1931, CO67/239/14, cited after Holland and Markides (2006), 185.

core of the *enosist* movement in Greece.[175] The Turkish Cypriots, though abstained from any participation to the uprising, were affected, as well, by the vengeful measures. On 7 November 1931, an article published in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Masum Millet* stated: "It is quite clear that these condemnable actions by the Greek Cypriot leadership will ultimately destroy the harmony that exists among people on the island."[176] The demonstration of the British might in supressing the uprising undermined the rising potential for the evolution of this so called "harmony" into a political cooperation between the two communities. A dictatorship was imposed, a dark period known as 'Palmerocracy',[177] a government of extended prohibitions and autocracy. It was only until 1941 that the Cypriots would partially restore their freedom – limited in local administration and economic activities.

Meanwhile, in Athens, Venizelos stressed the necessity of the friendship with Great Britain and Turkey; he had concluded his statement about the Cypriot uprising with a demand to "the Greek inhabitants of these islands that they be less egoistical."[178] Until the end of World War II, Cyprus was not included in the Greek foreign policy agenda.

The reshuffling of powers in the 1940's

Cyprus was involved in the World War II with two volunteer regiments, consisted of 25,000 Cypriots from both communities[179], that undertook transport tasks on all fronts. This contribution was acknowledged by Prime Minister Winston Churchill during his visit to the island in early 1943. Despite public statements for a liberal management of the Cypriot's aspirations, by the end of the war there was a clear convergence in colonial policy applied by both the Tories and the Labour party: Cyprus would remain under British domination for strategic reasons. The planning included future autonomy to the island combined with economic promotion; in return, a few British airbases would be retained.[180] The end of World War II heralded the establishment of a new status quo in Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. Great Britain, though, continued to govern Cyprus based on the ideal of being 'masters in

[175] Crawshaw (1978), 27; Richter (2010), 32.
[176] Petros Stylianou, *Τα Οκτωβριανά. Η εξέγερση του 1931 στην Κύπρο* [The October 1931 Movement in Cyprus] (Nicosia, 1984), 174-176, cited after Yennaris (2003), 36-37.
[177] Named after the British Governor Herbert Richmond Palmer (1933-1939).
[178] Richter (2010), 31-32.
[179] Ibid. Nancy Crawshaw argues that the majority of those volunteers serving the Cypriot Regiment were Turkish Cypriots, see Crawshaw (1978), 43.
[180] Richter (2010), 35-36.

their own house'[181] but the British power in the region was significantly curtailed and the imminent withdrawal from the Middle East was already apparent.

During the same period, besides the general stagnation emanated from the British rule, new dynamics appeared at the island. The most influential of them was the foundation of the Reform Party of the Working People (AKEL) in 1941, under the leadership of the intellectual Ploutis Servas, sponsored by moderates and leftists. The party attracted its members largely from the trade unions, [182] offering an alternative to the nationalist faction still demanding '*enosis and only enosis.'* Ideologically, following the German invasion in Russia, as a party with communist affiliations, it was part of the anti-fascist front. By the end of the second World War, AKEL was the only well-organized political party in the island and one of the few political institutions to which both Greek and Turkish Cypriots belonged.[183]

Greece was drifted within a brutal civil war between communist partisans and the right-wing adherents until 1949. In the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, the Cyprus question was not discussed. The first attempt to rise the Cypriot issue emanated from the Greek Communist party.[184] Following a meeting held in late 1948 between Cypriot AKEL's leaders and the leader of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) N. Zachariadis, AKEL revised its strategy towards the *enosis* course. The aim behind this decision was to give prominence to the "monarchic-fascist betrayal" and the "selloff of Cyprus" by the "civic governments" that failed to claim the island from the British.[185] Pragmatic members such as Ploutis Servas were ignored. AKEL did not manage to overcome the pressure put by the Church and the right-wing propaganda questioning the party's patriotism and its devotion to the popular *enosis* movement.[186] As Sia Anagnostopoulou argues, from 1950 until 1955, AKEL failed to the de- religionization of the political life

[181] Holland and Markides (2006), 217.
[182] The trade unions united in Pancypriot Union Committee (PSE). In response, the rich peasants organised themselves into the Pancyprian Agrarian Union (PEK) who later actively supported the EOKA activities, while the Cypriot right, encouraged by the British, founded their own trade union (SEK), see Richter (2010), 35.
[183] Crawshaw (1978), 30-31; Holland and Markides (2006), 215.
[184] By N. Zachariades on his release from Dachau at the end of the war, C. M Woodhouse, *The apple of Discord* (London: Hutchinson, 1948), 243, cited after Crawshaw (1978), 57.
[185] Petros Papapolyviou, 'Ο Αγώνας της ΕΟΚΑ και η ταυτότητα «Προδότης»: Η χρήση της λέξης, η προϊστορία, το έγκλημα και η τιμωρία' [The EOKA Struggle and the identity "traitor": the use of the word, the prehistory, the crime and the punishment], in Gounaris V.K, Kalyvas S.N, Stefanidis I.D. (eds.) *Ανορθόδοξοι Πόλεμοι: Μακεδονία, Εμφύλιος, Κύπρος* [Unorthodox wars: Macedonia, Civil war, Cyprus] (Athens: Patakis, 2010), 381.
[186] Richter (2010), 40.

in Cyprus: *enosis* will eventually be transformed from an idealistic slogan into a realistic aim of a, prepared but not politically decided, struggle.[187]

The Church was decided to combat communism and to undermine AKEL's mass social basis. The emergence of an electoral politics could challenge its ethnarchic role. The senior clergy rejected any participation in the British-led Consultative Assembly over self-government proposals (known as *Diaskeptiki*) and unequivocally declared: "[L]et the faint-hearted progress towards Autonomy and we towards Enosis. And we shall see who will reach the finishing line first."[188] The consequences of this competition and the ensued polarisation within the Greek Cypriot community will resurface during the violent clashes from 1955 onwards.

Important developments also involved the Turkish Cypriot community. Already from 1928, the British authorities had abolished the office of Mufti and had put the Muslim pious foundations (*Evkaf*) under their supervision. Following the abolition of the Legislative Council in 1931, the mediator between the rulers and the mass of the Muslim community was limited to one person, an appointed Turkish Cypriot, member of one of the old traditional Muslim families. This arrangement was an impediment to the direct influence of the modernising reforms applied in Turkey.[189] A group of Kemalists in the island, though, was not willing to comply with the old establishment. Fazil Küçük and Rauf Denktaş were among its members. Both Turkish Cypriot elite groups, the 'traditional' and the 'nationalist', were distant from the mass of their ordinary co-religionists. But the oppression by the British administration had created strong sentiments of disillusionment among the Muslim community, which were further intensified by the dynamic resurfacing of the *enosis* movement. Küçük and Denktaş marked a shift in their policy towards the defence of their political rights through a rather moderate nationalist rhetoric – not anti-British but inspiring enough to encompass the hopes of the Turkish Cypriot masses and to mobilise them. Küçük wrote in 1943:

> "For many years there has been a Turkish Cypriot community whose members are unconnected and disorganised. Who is responsible for this situation? We have to admit that blame does not lie with the [British] government or the other communities. We the Turks are

[187] Anagnostopoulou (2002), 213-214.
[188] Published in newspaper *Ethnos*, quoted in Rolandos Katsiaounis, *I Diaskeptiki 1946–1948* (Nicosia, 2000) 328; Holland and Markides (2006), 219 – 221.
[189] Crawshaw (1978), 42-43.

> ourselves responsible because we have not managed to benefit from the rights given to us by the government from the beginning."[190]

A few weeks later, Küçük and other Turkish Cypriot intellectuals founded the Association of the Turkish Minority in Cyprus (KATAK), the first Turkish Cypriot political organization, encouraged by the British[191] as counterweight to the Greek Cypriot *enosis* movement. In Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots who had migrated following the Treaty of Lausanne, significantly contributed - through academic institutions and the activity of small groups - in diverting the attention of the Turkish government, press and public opinion over the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community.[192]

As regards to the trade unions, from the onset the Turkish Cypriots were members of the Pancypriot Union Committee (PSE) and together with Greek Cypriots were pioneers in joint social struggles against the established economic and political elites. But the infiltration of anti-communist rhetoric by the conservative right-wing Greek Cypriots combined with the rising political aspirations of the Cypriot Kemalists eventually undermined the unity of the Cypriot workers. New trade unions were founded, manipulated by diverse political powers. The support by the British authorities was the catalyst to this rupture and one more opportunity for socio-political cooperation between the two communities was lost.[193]

[190] Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Soz*, 10 March 1943, cited after Yennaris (2003), 40.
[191] Costas Yennaris mentions that Turkish Cypriot historians and researchers like Hasmet Gurkan, Arif Tahsin and Osman Orek share this view about the British stance, ibid., 41.
[192] Crawshaw (1978), 44-45. For example, on 13 and 16 December 1948 a distinguished editor of the liberal Turkish newspaper *Vatan* placed emphasis on the fact that Turkey could not agree to the annexation of Cyprus to Greece should the British abandon the island.
[193] Yennaris (2003), 43-48; Richter (2010), 35.

CHAPTER FIVE

The clash of nationalisms in Cyprus 1950-1960

Internal and external dynamics

In Cyprus, the plebiscite held in 1950 confirmed the unanimous demand of the Greek Cypriots for unification with Greece.[194] The incarnation of the *enosis* movement and the new and able adversary of the British was Michael Christodoulos Mouskos, the later Archbishop Makarios III. Born of a peasant family at Pano Panaghia in the Paphos District, Mouskos was educated in Cyprus, Greece and in the United States. Against the ecclesiastic tradition, he was not a militant communist; he (eventually) realised that *enosis* could not be achieved without support from AKEL and, by extension, the Eastern Bloc. Makarios built up a wide range of contacts with political and other actors in Greece, to draw more attention to the Greek Cypriot aspirations. In parallel, he undertook an active campaign to rise interest of the public opinion in the United States, through a wide network of local Orthodox prelates and the formation of various committees.[195]

During his stay in Athens, Makarios met Colonel Georgios Grivas. Upon their meeting in 1951, the latter started the preparation of a revolutionary organization and an armed upheaval. Grivas, born in Cyprus, was the son of a corn dealer and money lender. He was trained in Athens military school and in Paris. He joined the Greek army during the Asia Minor campaign and the Greek- Italian war in 1940/1. An ardent anti-communist, he founded 'Khi', a fanatically anti-communist organization, armed by the German Nazis and later by the British, on whose part he fought after the end of the war at the events in Athens, known as 'Decemvriana'.[196] In 1953, Grivas described the aim of the armed struggle in Cyprus as a way to create troubles that would put pressure on Britain to negotiate with Greece. But soon this - originally limited – objective was exceeded. In 1957, he declared that "the struggle will go on all the way to the end".[197]

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[194] 96.5 per cent of Greek Cypriots favoured *enosis*. A very small number of Turkish Cypriot signatures appended to the resolution, Holland and Markides (2006), 223.
[195] Crawshaw (1978), 46, 68; Richter (2010), 43-44.
[196] Richter (2010), 44.
[197] Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 'Ο ανορθόδοξος πόλεμος ως μοχλός πολιτικής στην ελληνική ιστορία' [The anorthodox war as political leverage in Greek history], in Gounaris V.K, Kalyvas S.N, Stefanidis I.D. (eds.) *Ανορθόδοξοι Πόλεμοι: Μακεδονία, Εμφύλιος, Κύπρος* [Unorthodox wars: Macedonia, Civil war, Cyprus] (Athens: Patakis, 2010), 30-31,

Alongside the internal developments, the international environment formed the external dynamics that led the *enosis* request to defeat and eventually to the political partition of the island. The Cold War set the parameters of a new balance of powers in the region. Following its accession to NATO, Turkey envisaged an overextended role in the neighbouring areas and the integration into the Cold War system by undertaking the security needs of the alliance in the region. The Menderes government was encouraged by the United States; the Turks viewed this membership as acknowledgment of a partnership equal to that of the Western powers.[198]

In Greece, the military defeat of the communists in the battle of Grammos in 1949 marked the end of the civil war but the 'danger of communism' was not eliminated. All Greek governments were bound by the same basic foreign policy: close co-operation in the Western Alliance and the revival of Greek-Turkish friendship in the interest of mutual security.[199] When Greece joined the Atlantic alliance in 1952, the country was viewed by the United States as an appropriate actor in the region to delay the Soviet and/or her satellite powers in case of a world war. Within the NATO framework, Turkey undertook the operational responsibility to defend the Straights along with her sea and land borders with Soviet Union, while Greece would defend the Aegean Sea and the Greek- Bulgar borderline. In other words, the two states were strategically intermingled, perceived as a united defence space. In terms of location, demography and geographic depth, Turkey was more important than Greece for the operational needs of NATO.[200] It is against this background that the Cyprus issue must be viewed when the crisis escalated in the mid 1950's.

In the early 1950's, both Greece and Turkey were preoccupied with the Balkan front and for that reason they were ready to overlook the emerging crisis in Cyprus - [201] but only conditionally. The Turks would react in case of any change of sovereignty in Cyprus. In Athens, the government – under pressure from the press, public opinion, opposition politicians and Christian Orthodox prelates - was still trying to avoid friction

[198] Ayşegül Sever, 'Turkey's Search to Harmonize Its Security Engagements in the 1950s', in Rajak Sv., Botsiou K.E., Karamouzi E. Hatzivassiliou Ev. (eds) *The Balkans in the Cold War* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 110-113.
[199] Crawshaw (1978), 61-62.
[200] Yiorgos Tsitsopoulos and Thanos Veremis, 'Οι Ελληνοτουρκικές Αμυντικές Σχέσεις 1945-1987' [The Greek-Turkish Defence Relations 1945-1987], in Alexandris A., Veremis Th., Kazakos P., Coufoudakis V., Rozakis Ch. L., Tsitsopoulos Y. (eds.) *Οι Ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις 1923 - 1987* [The Greek- Turkish Relations: 1923-1987] (Athens: Gnosis, 1991), 179-183.
[201] Sever (2016), 116.

with Britain, opting for bilateral talks with London over the issue of Cyprus.[202] In 1953, though, when Anthony Eden, as British Foreign Secretary told the distinguished military hero Greek Prime Minister Field Marshal Papagos, in offensive manner, that Cyprus was non-discussable,[203] this moderate policy changed. When Greece announced, in early 1954, that it would take the Cyprus issue to the United Nations, Britain concluded that friendship with Greece was dispensable should the evolution of the Cyprus matter require such a sacrifice.[204]

The internationalisation of the Cypriot struggle through appeals to the United Nations by Greece had failed. The British government, persistently, underestimated the dynamic of Creek Cypriot demands, considering that "no organization, no party, no funds, no agents, and they will win nothing."[205] Conflict loomed on the horizon, fuelled by the use of the word 'never' when British were discussing the prospect of self-determination in Cyprus.[206] The pressure from the right-wing of Conservatives in Britain played an important role towards this political direction. Furthermore, it is worth- mentioning that after the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal, Cyprus may not have been the best substitute for Britain's Suez base lost in 1954. It was, though, an important headquarters and radio communications centre located ideally for the monitoring of the Soviet naval activity[207] and electronic eavesdropping operations.

The struggle for freedom

The use of violence erupted in Nicosia on 1 April 1955. The explosion of a number of bombs signified the start of the armed Greek Cypriot uprising and the activity of the shadowy organization EOKA (National Organization of Greek Cypriot Fighters) under the leadership of Grivas. The operation was approved by the political leader Makarios. Within the anti-imperialistic objective, the targets were the Greek Cypriot 'traitors' and the British personnel, not the Turkish Cypriots.[208] The latter,

[202] Crawshaw (1978), 67-71.
[203] "There was a considerable Greek population in New York, but he did not suppose that the Greek Government was demanding Enosis for them": record of Conversation between the Secretary of State and Field-Marshall Papagos, 22 Sept. 1953, FO371/107499, cited after Holland and Markides (2006), 224-225.
[204] See notes of meeting held by the Minister of State, 29 June 1954, FO371/111848, cited after ibid.
[205] Armitage to Thomas Lloyd, 13 Sept. 1954, CO926/500, cited after ibid., 225.
[206] Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, vol. dxxxi (Commons), 28 July 1954, cols. 504–7, cited after ibid., 225-226.
[207] John C. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy* (2nd ed., New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), 198-199, cited after Coufoudakis (1976), 36-37.
[208] Half of the Greek Cypriots victims were policemen. The rest were public servants, shop keepers, owners of coffee shops, bus and taxi drivers. The objective was to deter them from becoming whistle-blowers, see Kyriacos Markides, 'Social Change and the Rise and Decline of Social Movements: The case of Cyprus' *American*

along with Turkey, became actively involved as part of the British strategy to combat *enosis*. The EOKA members were set up against the Turkish Cypriot community as the British policy makers made the self-determination request subject to the option of partition. Against this background, the Tripartite London Conference in 1955, consolidated Turkey's intervention right to the future of Cyprus.

What the Kemalist Cypriots had failed to achieve over the last decades, was accomplished by the British approach. Turkey raised the matter of protection, security and justice for the Turkish Cypriot community: the legally recognised British sovereignty and Turkey's right to protect her own security could not be overlooked in the name of the principle of self-determination.[209] The expressed will for the promotion of her friendship with Greece, along with her role within NATO for the benefit of peace in the region, created a suitable context for the international recognition of Turkey's initiatives.

In Greece, the public began to boil with rage for the withholding of the right of the majority of Cypriots to self-determination. The government in Athens found herself in a diplomatically awkward position. In Turkey, during the conference in London, violent anti – Greek riots erupted in Constantinople and Smyrna. Students, discontented peasants from the nearby Anatolian and Thracian villages along with city's *lumpenproletariat* comprised a crowd of demonstrators that targeted the property of the Greek element (and to a lesser extent other non-Muslim minorities) in Constantinople. This direct attack by the demonstrators, within few hours, culminated in 16 fatalities, 200 cases of rape, looting and extensive destruction. The Menderes government attributed the attacks to a "communist plot."[210]

Greek Cypriots versus Turkish Cypriots

Members of the organization 'Cyprus is Turkish' were responsible for the events in Constantinople, acting as instruments of a plan directed by the Turkish government.[211] In the same year, 'Volkan' was founded in Cyprus, the first underground, armed Turkish Cypriot organization. Its aim was (the forcible if

Ethnologist, 1, (1974), 319-320; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 'Cyprus at the Crossroads 1959-63', *European History Quarterly*, 35, (2005), 534; Papapolyviou (2010), 384-385.

[209] Crawshaw (1978), 132.

[210] Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and the Greek- Turkish relations 1918-1974* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992), 256- 263.

[211] Alexandris (1991), 499-501.

necessary) alignment of the Turkish Cypriots with the policy of violent reaction to the EOKA activity. In 1956, Küçük, with the approval of Menderes, started preaching partition of the island. In 1957, TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization) was set up by the Special War Department of Turkey.[212] TMT became the sole Turkish Cypriot underground organization, its aims not being confined to blocking *enosis*; TMT's statement declared that: "The Cypriot Turk's sole representative is Turkey and his cry is 'Partition' and only 'Partition'".[213] Soon, though, the aim was extended. A new project named the 'Cyprus Restitution Project' was launched to lay the ground for a military intervention and take the island as a whole.[214] The political advisor of the TMT was Rauf Denktaş. A network was organized by Ankara under the leadership of Colonel Riza Vuruşkan of the Turkish army including branches for coordination, training, supplies, telecommunication, weapons and logistics. By 1958, the ethnic cleansing operation against Greek Cypriots was set in motion through murders, expulsions, street fights, destruction of properties and wide spread terrorism over the whole island. Earlier that year, Menderes had refused to meet with Governor Foot visiting Ankara. A new security assessment concluded that the British had more to fear from TMT than from EOKA.[215] According to american sources, during a meeting in Athens with the Karamanlis government, one British Foreign Office aide admitted that the partition plan - once afforded by the British - had been 'unhappy and idiotic', but that having been made it could not now be repudiated.[216]

The appearance of a Governor who "should be seen to treat the Greeks in the same way as the Turks"[217] remained the overwhelming priority for the colonial administration that was struggling for survival. At the same time, in Cyprus the clashes had gone out of control. Executions by EOKA members - with recruitment of schoolboys, assassinations by TMT, killings of unarmed civilians and counterproductive measures like law extension of death penalty, tortures in prison, the exile of Archbishop Makarios, the AKEL's ban, next to cleansing operations, intimidation and life threats, plunders, prohibitions, provocative transmissions by radio stations in Athens and Ankara, all comprised the reality of civil war in Cyprus. Between 1 April 1955 and 31

[212] For the *Volkan* and the *TMT* see Yennaris (2003), 80-92; Richter (2010), 82 – 84; Kızılyürek (2010), 180-184.
[213] Akkurt, A., *Türk Mukavemet Tes¸kilatı* (Istanbul, 1999), 42, cited after Kızılyürek (2010), 180.
[214] Tansu, I., *Aslında Kimse Uyumuyordu* (Ankara, n.d.), 37, cited after ibid., 180 – 181.
[215] Holland and Markides (2006), 235.
[216] Penfield (Athens), telegram to State Department, 15 Feb. 1958, RGsg, State Department Records, Box 3283, USNA, cited after Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954–59* (Oxford, 1998), 233.
[217] Notes of meeting in Foreign Office, 3 Feb. 1958, FO371/136305, RGC10319/32, cited after ibid., 232.

December 1959, 250 EOKA members, 104 members of the British forces, 51 policemen and 288 civilian victims of EOKA lost their lives. 360 soldiers were killed due to accidents. 601 soldiers, 206 policemen and 288 civilians were wounded. During inter-communal clashes, 115 Cypriots - from both communities - lost their lives and 184 were wounded.[218] Over the next years, many of the protagonists of the events received honours for their action. Partition was avoided but, as Heinz Richter points out, "the real aim of the struggle, *enosis*, was not achieved."[219]

The controversial result

The struggle for "*enosis* and only *enosis*" next to the "partition or death" campaign led Cyprus to deadlock. Following the internationalisation of the Cypriot issue, several diplomatic initiatives failed, revealing the political weakness of the Creek and Greek Cypriot aspirations within the world politics and the rivalry of great powers in the region. Following the agreements of Zurich and London, after 82 years of British rule and many centuries of foreign domination, the First Republic of Cyprus was established on 16 August 1960. It was a NATO - inspired Cold War compromise, often described as a 'Reluctant Democracy'.[220] All three fundamental agreements, the Constitution, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance confined the newly established bi-communal state within a circle where any free expression of internal constitutional policy or independent foreign policy was excluded. Any dispute over the implementation of the agreements was subjected, even unilaterally, to the guarantee powers, thus marking the de-internationalisation of the Cypriot issue, with all the ensuing consequences.[221] Within the island, integration was far from being accomplished. Fear and mistrust amongst Cypriot citizens, aggravated by the excess constitutional concessions to the Turkish Cypriots - out of proportion to their real demographic strength -,[222] undermined the arousing of real loyalty to the state. The patriotic objectives for *enosis* and partition, by both communities respectively, were defeated, for the time, but not eliminated.

[218] All figures cited after Richter (2010), 92.
[219] Ibid.
[220] The term is after the book title of Stephen Xydis, *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973).
[221] Giorgos Tenekidis, 'Διεθνοποίηση και Αποδιεθνοποίηση του Κυπριακού πριν και μετά την Τουρκική εισβολή' [Internationalisation and de-internationalisation of the Cypriot issue before and after the Turkish invasion], in Tenekidis G., Kranidiotis G. (eds.) *Κύπρος: Ιστορία, Προβλήματα και Αγώνες του λαού της* [Cyprus: History, Problems and Struggles of its people] (2nd ed., Athens: Estia-Kollaru, 2000), 217-219.
[222] Richter (2010), 97.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

Niyazi Kızılyürek describes some aspects of the life of the probably most fervent nationalist Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Raif Denktaş (born in 1924 in Cyprus) as follows:

> "His first dog Rex was a present from family friend, Greek Cypriot Giangos. It was a Greek who saved his father's life. He obtained the money he needed to go into business from a Greek Cypriot. In 1964, during the ethnic clashes, it was a Greek who sent his wife and children to Ankara for their own protection. When in 1967 he fell hostage to the Greeks he received much better treatment than any other Turk possibly could. In 1970 when his boat capsized in the open sea off Kyrenia and he risked drowning, it was once more a Greek who saved his life."[223]

Against the fabricated narratives aiming to demonstrate the intolerable relationship between the two communities in Cyprus, there is far more evidence to the opposite. For centuries, both communities lived alongside each other within the medieval context of living and governing a heterogeneous, multi-ethnic and multi religious empire.

When the British arrived in the island, eighty per cent of the people were peasants, living in mixed villages, largely illiterate, deprived of any access to power, depended on the great landowners and all of them equally impoverished. They were alienated from the Enlightenment and all the ensuing developments in Europe during the 19th century. Through the well-educated and privileged Cypriots, nationalism infiltrated the island, infused with the vested interests of both the traditional and the emerging local elites and their rivalries. The two distinct, homogenous cultural-religious communities evolved into two *national* communities, as extensions of two different 'motherlands' on the grounds of the respectively constructed myths over common, glorious ancestors.

[223] Kızılyürek (2010), 175.

The British Governors– with only few exceptions – viewed the Cypriot people as 'natives', segregated to non-Muslims and Muslims. Behind the façade of liberal reforms and the establishment of a distorted version of representative government, both communities educated the next generations as Greeks and Turks, respectively. The growing *enosis* movement encompassed the expectations of Greek Cypriots for improvement of the living conditions by ending foreign domination and by unifying with the 'National centre' as free expression of the people's majority. Simultaneously, existential anxiety was growing amongst the Turkish Cypriots along with fears of a fate similar to that of their co-religionists in Crete. The British refusal to negotiate with the Greek Cypriots and the continuation of heavy taxation put forward the most radical elements.

After World War II, the international environment was increasingly affecting the Cypriot issue. The internationalisation of the Greek Cypriot request for self-determination revealed the inherent contradictions of a pre-war irredentist nationalism and the after-war ideological context of decolonisation. As the analogy between means and objectives became unfavourable for the *enosis* movement, the Turkish warnings were underestimated. The implementation of a short-sighted policy by the weakened British rule paved the way for Turkey's official involvement in the island. The replacement of the British 'protective hand' by the Turkish one mobilised the Turkish Cypriot masses and accelerated the alienation between the two communities in all aspects of economic and social life. Against a turbulent geopolitical background, the prevalence of radical nationalists within an abortive - imposed from outside powers - constitutional state prevented the development of a common Cypriot citizenship and eventually heralded the beginning of the end of the long-standing peaceful relationship between the two communities of Cyprus.

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Appendix

Map of Cyprus
Source: United Nations

Map of Cyprus
Source:www.geographicguide.net

COMPOSITION OF CYPRIOT POPULATION 1881-1960

RELIGION	**1881**	**1891**	**1901**	**1911**	**1921**	**1931**	**1946**	**1960**
Christian Orthodox	137,631	158,585	182,739	214,480	244,887	276,572	361,199	441,656
Muslims	45,458	47,926	51,309	56,428	61,339	64,245	80,548	104,942
Gregorian Armenians	179	280	517	558	1,197	3,375	3,686	3,378
Roman Catholics	2,105	915	824	815	951	851	1,014	4,505
Maronites		1,131	1,130	1,073	1,350	1,704	2,088	2,752
Others	800	449	503	754	991	1,212	1,534	16,333
Total	**186,173**	**209,286**	**237,022**	**274,108**	**310,715**	**347,959**	**450,069**	**573,566**

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Source: *Department of Statistics and Research – Ministry of Finance, Republic of Cyprus.*



Larnaca 1878
Source: www.gundemkibris.com

Cypriot village
Source: www.gundemkibris.com

Cypriot women
Source: *www.gundemkibris.com*

A Cypriot participating in the World War
Source: *www.gundemkibris.com*

Waving Turkish and British flags in the streets of Nicosia
Source: www.gundemkibris.com



Dr Fazıl Küçük
Source: Wikipedia.

Rauf Denktaş
Source: Aljazeera.

A general view of the large crowd out to greet the returning exiled Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş in Nicosia
Source: gettyimages.

Archbishop Makarios III
Source: gettyimages.

Makarios arrives in Nicosia after Lausanne (1959)
Source: www.anixneuseis.gr

Demonstration for *enosis* by Cypriots living in London. From an article in Italian newspaper
Source: Salt Galata Archives, Istanbul.


An EOKA parade in Nicosia (1962)
Source: The Times



Colonel George Grivas (1964)
Source: gettyimages.


An armed priest in Cyprus (1964)
Source: BBC.

Turkish troops in Cyprus
Source: gettyimages.